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   Standpipes that dispense water from utilities are the 
most common alternatives to piped water connections 
for poor customers in the cities of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Fifty-five percent of the unconnected urban population 
relies on standpipes as their first water source. Other 
informal water providers include household resellers and 
a variety of water tankers and vendors, which are the first 
water source of 1 percent and 3 percent of the urban 
population, respectively. 
   In the cities studied, the percentage of unconnected 
households ranges from 12 percent to 86 percent of 
the population. The percentage of unconnected people 
covered by standpipes is substantially higher for countries 
with higher rates of household connection, while the 
percentage of unconnected people covered by water 
tankers or water vendors is higher for countries with 
This paper—a product of the Sustainable Development Division, Africa Region—is part of a larger effort in the department 
to improve the global knowledge base on African infrastructure as part of the Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic. 
Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted 
at skeener@worldbank.org.  
lower rates of household connection. 
   Water prices in the informal market are much higher 
than for households with private connections or yard 
taps. Although standpipes are heavily subsidized by 
utilities, the prices charged by standpipe operators 
are closely related to the informal water reseller price. 
Standpipe management models also affect the informal 
price of water. For example, the shift from utilities 
management to delegated management models without 
complementary regulation or consumer information has 
often led to declines in service levels and increased prices. 
   Standpipes are not the only or even the most efficient 
solution in peri-urban areas. Programs that promote 
private household connections and arrangements that 
improve pricing and services in the household resale 
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1    Urbanization and the unconnected water market 
Sub-Saharan Africa is the fastest urbanizing region in the world, a phenomenon accompanied by 
growth in informal settlements. At the same time, its GDP per capita has been falling at an annual rate of 
0.66 percent (WDI 2007). This combination of urban growth and economic recession has contributed to 
the expansion of informal settlements (Fay and Opal 2006). For example, for the 24 Sub-Saharan African 
countries included in this study, total population grew at an annual average of 2.5 percent, while the 
growth of slum population has doubled at 4.43 percent in the past decade. 
Countries have been unable to match investment and maintenance in urban water and sanitation 
services with urban growth and have not prioritized expansion in informal settlement areas. Utilities, 
central actors in service delivery in the urban context, face risks and transaction costs in doing business in 
informal settlements; these include the unclear legal status of many residences in these areas, which 
increases the possibility of demolition of the settlement (Kariuki and others 2003), as well as physical 
challenges to planning networks for haphazard residences that may be later changed or regularized. At the 
same time, incentives to perform according to financial targets have discouraged utilities from prioritizing 
expansion in these areas.  
The situation is especially acute in post-conflict areas. The urban process is accelerated by people 
from refugee camps and insecure rural areas that stream into unplanned urban areas. At the same time, 
conflict, particularly prolonged conflict, exposes infrastructure to deterioration, and diverts the attention 
of utilities away from improvements in finance, continued investment, and management. High-conflict 
countries tend to have higher percentages of unconnected population (table 1.1).  
The gap in private water connections in urban areas has been filled by a wide range of alternative 
water providers. These include suppliers such as public standpipes/kiosks (part of the formal water 
sector), and alternative sources in the “informal” water market. In addition, households seek their own 
alternative free sources by harvesting rainwater, drilling shallow wells. and collecting surface water. The 
ability of the alternative suppliers to provide an adequate service to unconnected people is still under 
debate, but the literature recognizes their important role. That recognition is beginning to give us a better 
understanding of the function of alternative suppliers in water provision to the urban poor (Collignon and 
Vézina 2000; Kariuki and others 2003; Kariuki and Schwartz 2005; Keener and Banerjee 2007). 
The unconnected market is heterogenous and made up of many players. Figure 1.1 presents the 
different categories of alternative providers considered in the study according to the relationship to the 
water source and technology employed in water service delivery. The formal alternatives include public 
standpipes/kiosks, which can be managed under a variety of schemes. The informal alternatives include 
sources that resell network water. In most countries with low- to medium-coverage, the most important 
informal source is people who resell water directly from their house connection. Given its importance, it 
is surprising that there are so few in-depth case studies of the prevalence of this practice, its coverage, and 
its market dynamics.  PROVISION OF WATER TO THE POOR IN AFRICA 
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Table 1.1   Slum and unconnected population sorted by conflict incidence 
Conflict index  Country 
Slum urban popula
(% of total urban pop
High 
DRC  50 
Sudan  86 
Uganda  93 
Angola  83 
Medium 
Ethiopia  99 
Mozambique  94 
Rwanda  88 
Côte d'Ivoire  68 
Namibia  38 
Chad  99 
Low 
Kenya  71 
Lesotho  57 
Nigeria  79 
Ghana  70 
Benin  84 
Burkina Faso  77 
Niger  96 
Senegal  76 
South Africa  33 
Malawi  91 
Zambia  74 
Cameroon  67 
Cape Verde  70 
Madagascar  93 
Tanzania  92 
Mauritania  94 
Average  77.73 
High conflict index  78 
Medium conflict index  81 
Low conflict index  76 
Source: UN Habitat 2005; AICD DHS/MICS Database, 2007. 
Note: The conflict index is a compound indicator that takes into account four different measures related to conflict incidence: lapse of time since the last violent conflict
* 2001 data  ** latest available data. 
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Figure 1.1   Typology according to source and technology employed 
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Source: Kariuki and Schwartz, 2005 
 
Mobile distributors, often referred to as vendors, supply a large share of the urban unconnected 
population in only a few countries. Private standpipes dependent on network water are even more rare. 
Non-network sources include small-scale independent providers (SSIPs)—businesses or people that sell 
water from sources they have developed or found such as boreholes, wells, or even rivers. In the past 
decade, these various sources, which together comprise the “ informal”water market, have gained more 
attention from the development community. 
This paper summarizes the available knowledge on standpipes and the informal water sector, focusing 
primarily on coverage, price transmission mechanisms, regulation, and standpipe management in urban 
Africa.  It identifies gaps in the research and outlines priorities in terms of future field work to fill those 
gaps. In preparing the paper, we performed an extensive review of all of the available literature on the 
topic and analyzed data from a subset of African countries (see below).  Another objective of the study is 
to design indicators that show cross-country comparisons of the structure of the informal water market 
and its relative importance. 
The paper draws upon two data sets, the AICD DHS/MICS database 2007 and the AICD WSS 
database (2007). The first database relies on 63 national Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) 
covering households in 32 countries. This DHS database provides information on water services at the 
urban level based on household surveys. The second database, AICD WSS, is based on surveys of 
government officials and utility staff in the largest city of each of 24 countries in Africa 
1. Existing 
independent case studies based on sector-specific field research were used to fill specific data gaps and to 
test the validity of some utility-reported data appearing in the AICD WSS database (2007). 
A study on the unconnected market is complicated by data constraints. The AICD DHS/MICS 
database (2007) on water coverage is very comprehensive, but the breakdown of water by source does not 
include household water resellers of water as a separate category; it therefore misses the coverage 
                                                 
1 With the exception of Kaduna, Nigeria, the AICD 2007 Database is based on information collected during January 
– July 2007 in 24 countries in Africa, and included a module on SSIPs for the largest city in each country. PROVISION OF WATER TO THE POOR IN AFRICA 
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information of an increasingly important informal water service provider.
2 DHS data refers only to a 
primary source of water, and it fails to capture the fact that households in sub-Saharan Africa, and in 
particular the urban poor, are increasingly forced to rely on more than one source of water. In the case of 
the AICD WSS database, data is divided between information coming from utility staff and government 
documents (74 percent) and independent studies (10 percent);
3 comparing these two data sources provided 
for a more accurate assessment of what the current multi-country data sources were missing. Comparison 
of case studies and the AICD analysis on the informal sector revealed that there was serious bias 
depending on the source. Independent studies note that information from the utility or the government 
overestimated the coverage of the population by standpipes and underestimated the extent of the informal 
water sector. Because of these caveats, comparable cross-country information (DHS) on the urban 
informal water sector is most likely to provide an indication of its minimum coverage rather than an 
overall coverage level.
4  
There is tremendous diversity among countries in the size of the unconnected market as well as in the 
composition of coverage provided by each water supplier. The unconnected urban population can be 
anywhere above 80 percent in Uganda, Mozambique, Rwanda, Nigeria, and Madagascar. In contrast, the 
middle-income countries in Southern Africa—Namibia and South Africa—have 21 percent and 12 
percent unconnected urban population respectively. Central and Eastern Africa rely to a greater degree on 
standpipes (almost as important as house/yard connections); Western Africa has slightly lower reliance on 
standpipes (21 percent of the urban population) but substantially higher reliance on wells and boreholes 
(37 percent of the urban population), which can also capture a portion of the informal sector market. It is 
interesting that ECOWAS countries, despite being only slightly richer in per capita terms than central 
ones, enjoy much better piped water coverage (table 1.2). This regional (DHS) data must be interpreted 
with caution, because informal water sellers can show up under several categories: “standpipe” (SSIPs), 
“boreholes” (SSIPs), “house connection,” and “vendor.”  
                                                 
2 While DHS surveys ask respondents about water vendors, the informal water sector can take many forms, from 
resale of water from house connections, to resale from boreholes, to more traditional mobile water vendors who may 
obtain water for a variety of sources (including public standposts); some households who purchase water from their 
neighbor’s piped connection categorize this source as piped water from a house connection rather than a vendor, 
particularly in countries where such purchase is illegal or discouraged. By the same token, the DHS surveys asking 
about standpost use do not distinguish between public, private, network or non-network standposts. In addition, 
much of the cross-country data only accounts for a primary source of water, when in fact poor households may 
regularly rely on multiple sources for different uses. Nonetheless, to date the only available cross country primary 
data for urban areas comes from these imperfect sources. 
3 Due to the common problem of lack of adequate records for the informal sector, about 16 percent of the 
information on the 24 largest cities in the study was not available. 
4 Comparison of case study data with DHS data suggests that households reliant on resale from neighbor’s taps are 
likely to report in categories other than “vendor” (for example, private tap, standpost, etc.). PROVISION OF WATER TO THE POOR IN AFRICA 
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Table 1.2  Urban households connected and unconnected to piped water by region 
Percent 
   Unconnected 
Region  Connected All  unconnected Standpipes  Wells  and  boreholes  Surface  Vendor  Other 
West  28 72 21  37  6 7 0 
Central 34  66  32 14 16  1  3 
East  37 63 31  20  8 1 3 
South  65 35 22  9  3 0 0 
Total  38 62 25  24  7 4 2 
Source: AICD DHS/MICS Database, 2007 
 
Most utilities have pursued expanded coverage and financial viability primarily via household 
connections, which are typically used to subsidize the cost of standpipes. Almost no urban utilities have 
pursued standpipes as a primary mode of expansion of coverage.
5 The percentage of unconnected people 
covered by standpipes is substantially higher for countries with higher household connection rates. In 
countries with medium to high household connection rates, 71 percent of the unconnected population 
relies on standpipes, on average.  In countries with low to medium household connection rates, 48 percent 
of the unconnected population relies on standpipes, on average; and in countries with very low household 
connection rates, 32 percent of the unconnected population relies on standpipes, on average. The very 
existence of a relatively expanded water network has spillover effects, allowing better access through 
standpipes.  
The prevalence of the informal market is directly linked to the household connection rate. Not 
surprisingly, the DHS data show that the percentage of unconnected people covered by water tankers or 
water vendors is higher for countries with lower household connection rates. Countries with very low 
household connection rates have 13 percent of their urban unconnected population that relies on either 
water trucks or water vendors, on average. In countries with low-medium household coverage rates, 4 
percent of the urban unconnected population relies on either water trucks or vendors, on average; for 
countries with medium-high household coverage rates, only 2 percent of the urban unconnected 
population relies on either water trucks or vendors, on average. 
Standpipes 
Standpipes represent the main source of water for unconnected households for most cities. Therefore, 
it is particularly important to take them into account if one is to understand not only the characteristics of 
water coverage but also the dynamics of the water market and supply chains. Average standpipe coverage 
in the cities studied is 28 percent, but standpipe coverage can provide up to 53 percent of the water supply 
for the unconnected households (table 1.3). These results are very much in line with the widespread belief 
that standpipes are the main water source for the urban poor and that the poor are likely to comprise a 
                                                 
5 In recent projects in urban Burundi, there is a greater focus on standpipes, largely because of constraints in bulk 
water supply and capital financing.  PROVISION OF WATER TO THE POOR IN AFRICA 
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larger proportion of standpipe users.
 6 The wide inter-city variation in standpipe coverage implies that the 
policies governing standpipes need to be tailored. The approach to standpipes in Johannesburg, where this 
source provides almost the totality of coverage to the unconnected and disconnected, will clearly differ 
from that in Khartoum, where water vendors abound and there is only marginal standpipe coverage, or 
from that in another country where some portion of standpipe users may actually be eligible for house 
connections but unable to pay the high connection fees.  
The “real” coverage of public standpipes falls when the results of independent sectoral surveys are 
compared to the official data from utilities and governments. Independent studies assessed the coverage 
provided by standpipes as well as by other alternative providers in detail and made it possible to compare 
results with official statistics. In Maseru, the capital of Lesotho, for example, MICS data revealed about 
50 percent of the urban population did not have a piped connection but the utility assumed that this 
segment was reliant on its free public standposts. However, an earlier detailed sectoral survey undertaken 
in Maseru in 2002 showed that coverage by free public standpipes was as low as 16 percent of the 
population, with the coverage among the unconnected falling from 100 percent to 24 percent of that 
population group (Sechaba/Hall 2002).
7 In spite of the three year lag between surveys, it is unlikely that 
this accounts for the differences in these numbers. Similarly, in Ethiopia the formal standpipe coverage is 
overestimated, with the gap filled by resale from household connections. 
Utility data deviate from sectoral household survey data in estimating standpipe coverage. The most 
common way utilities calculate standpost coverage is to multiply a “standard” number of people using a 
stand post (300–500ppl/standpipe) by the number of existing standpipes.
8 This estimation, however, can 
be highly inaccurate as it cannot take into account the variety of factors that affect the real usage of 
standposts (geographic distribution relative to population, distance, water pressure, operating hours, 
functioning or non functioning). In Ouagadougou, for example, the number of people that rely on 
standpipes was often calculated using a rate of 700 people per standpipe. However, detailed field studies 
showed that the real coverage was much lower; as a result, the utility reduced that “standard” number 
from 700 to 300 people per standpipe for water studies.
9 
                                                 
6 Standpipe users have higher incomes than those with no access to standpipes at the national level. The poorer rural 
population relies on less-improved water sources than standpipes. However, within urban areas, and in particular 
within primary cities, standpipes represent an important water source for lower income residents. 
7 These figures are likely to have changed. Since this study was completed, the WASA (the water utility) has 
undertaken a new standpost program focusing on token run standposts, with apparent success.  
8 For all the cities for which we could only rely on utility’s information, coverage was calculated this way. 
9 Personal communication with Seydou Traore, WSP, on September 25, 2007. PROVISION OF WATER TO THE POOR IN AFRICA 
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Table 1.3   Coverage of water supply in the largest cities 
23 cities included in AICD study 



















Country Largest  city  (%)  (%)  (%)  (yes/no/%)  (yes/no)  (yes/no)  (%) 
Benin Cotonou  31  N/V N/A yes no yes N/V 
Burkina 
Faso  Ouagadougou 34  61  N/A  no  5 no 92 
Ethiopia Addis  Ababa  39  40  N/A  yes  yes  no  66 
Mozambique Maputo  26  26 N/A  26 yes  12 35 
Niger Niamey  31  21 N/A no 10 no 30 
Nigeria Kaduna  48  2  N/V  yes  yes  no  3 
Rwanda Kigali  35  51  3.21  10 no  no  79 
Senegal Dakar  77  19  N/A  yes no no 81 
South Africa  Johannesburg  88  12  0.24  no  no  no  98 
DRC Kinshasa  36 N/V  N/A  yes no  yes  N/V 
Ghana Accra  56  N/V  N/V  yes  yes no N/V 
Kenya Nairobi  51  41 N/V  no  8 9 84 
Lesotho Maseru  33  16  1.00  31  5 no 24 
Malawi Blantyre  47  N/V  N/A  yes no no  N/V 
Namibia Windhoek  73  20 N/A  no no  no 74 
Sudan Great  Khartoum  27  0.11 0.43 yes  60 no 0.1 
Zambia Lusaka  27  58  N/A  yes  yes  no  79 
Cape Verde  Praia  34  60  6.30  no  no  no  90 
Chad N'Djamena  22  N/V N/V  yes yes  yes  N/V 
Cote d'Ivoire  Abidjan  65  N/V  N/A  yes  no  yes N/V 
Madagascar Antananarivo  42  34 N/A  yes 8 yes 58 
Tanzania  Dar es Salaam  29  4  2.00  35  2 yes 6 
Uganda Kampala  30  5 N/V  yes  yes  yes 7 
   Average  43  28  2.20  N/V  N/V  N/V  53 
   Median  35  21  2  N/V  N/V  N/V  66 
 Minimum  22  0.11  0  10  2  6  0.1 
 Maximum  88  61.0  6  35  60  12  98.1 
  
Number of countries with  
relevant presence  all  all  11/23 (48)  17/23 (74)  14/23 (61)  9/23 (39)   
Source: AICD WSS data, other. 
Note: For the unconnected market, the data obtained from independent studies have been highlighted. The remaining data come from utility 
and government sources. 
 
These factors point to a trend of utility overestimates of coverage from public standpipes. But in some 
countries, that overestimation is mitigated by substantial mobile resale of standpipe water. In cities where 
standpipe coverage is very low, vendors sell water door-to-door or from existing household connections. 
In these cases, while people may occasionally obtain their water from the standpipe, they also obtain it 
from vendors who buy it from the standpipe. Since utilities and standpipe operators do not keep track of PROVISION OF WATER TO THE POOR IN AFRICA 
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the different customers they serve, coverage numbers “hide” the breakdown by type of consumer. This is 
very important when it comes to understanding the price structure of the market, for the standpipe 
operator usually charges the direct consumer and the reseller differently. In peri-urban areas of Accra, 
although most water is sold primarily through standpipes, 20 percent of that water is resold by cart 
operators (Sarpong and Ambrampah 2006). Likewise, standpipes in Khartoum sell most of their water (80 
percent) to cart operators, who then resell it to households (Elamin and Gadir 2006). Similarly, in 
Ouagadougou, more than 80 percent of water sold at standpipes is bought by carters and not by 
individuals (Collignon and Vézina 2000). In Luanda, Angola, most of the water delivered in peri-urban 
areas, where the majority of the population lives, is brought in by trucks that sell water obtained either 
from the piped water system or directly from the river. The water trucks then sell the water to an 
estimated 10,000 nonmobile water vendors, primarily households that have built water storage tanks; 
these households in turn sell the water to the rest of the population. In peri-urban areas of Luanda, 70 
percent of the dwellers purchased their water from water vendors (Development Workshop 1995). 
Utilities reported that 19 percent of public standpipes were dysfunctional, but the real number is 
probably higher. Estimates of working standpipes obtained from independent studies gave much lower 
rates—with an average of 42 percent of standpipes in working order, versus the utility generated estimate 
of 81 percent (table 1.4). This raises reasonable doubts about the accuracy of the numbers reported by 
utilities on the status of standpipes.
10  
Further, many utilities do not have an updated inventory of existing public standpipes and their 
current operating conditions, reflecting a low level of monitoring of this generally low-revenue-
generating service for the utility—and an absence of regulation. Recent studies conclude that standpipes 
in many cities have been poorly maintained, with a decline in the number of standpipes in use as well as 
in the quality of their service (hours of operation and pressure) over time. For future research, it will be 
very important to understand the capacity that utilities have to deal with these issues, in terms of financial 
and human resources. Finally, the information base is weak in part because regulators often track hours of 
water service of the system, but not the number of standpipes in good working condition.  
Support for the premise that charging for standpipe water will provide incentives to the utility or to a 
standpipe manager to keep it in good working order does not clearly emerge from a review of 15 city 
utilities.  However, because of the caveats noted on utility reporting, this finding needs to taken with 
caution and prioritized for further scrutiny in future research. Countries with a higher conflict incidence 
show a somewhat lower percentage of standpipes in good working condition. 
                                                 
10 As reported in AICD WSS data. Since water provision through standpipes is considered an “improved” source in 
the MDGs (a person supplied through a household connection counts the same as one supplied by a standpipe), there 
is an incentive for government officials and utility staff to err on the side of “inflating” coverage numbers (Cudjoe 
and Okonski, 2006).  
Table 1.4   Public standpipes in good working order and free of 
charge in 15 cities 
Country Largest  city 
Share in good  
working order 
(%) 
Share free of  
charge (%) 
Sudan (HCI)  Great Khartoum  100  0 PROVISION OF WATER TO THE POOR IN AFRICA 
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Public standposts are by and large 
connected to a city-wide utility water 
system. Standposts that rely on 
groundwater for their supply are found 
only in cities with accessible groundwater 
resources and in less densely populated 
peri-urban areas with low exposure to 
pollution hazards. In these places, private 
boreholes have flourished, as noted 
below. These are most often found in 
specific areas within a city where the 
utility does not have a water network. 
Household resellers 
Perhaps the most significant sign of 
the inability of utilities to keep pace with 
urban growth is found in the development 
of household resellers in countries with 
medium to low water coverage levels. 
This phenomenon is somewhat hidden, but it emerges clearly when comparing detailed case studies. 
About 70 percent of utilities surveyed have reported that the resale of water from households is 
commonplace, and consumer assessment surveys in cities in Mozambique, Lesotho, Ethiopia, and other 
countries have shown that reliance on household water resellers can account for as much as 50 percent of 
water resources for a city’s population, and up to 80 percent of water resources for the urban poor.  
Households usually “hide” in the surveys the fact that they buy water from their neighbors because 
household water resellers often are not listed in the established categories of household surveys. 
Therefore, the household water resellers are concealed in the “piped water” or “other” coverage 
categories. Independent sectoral surveys on the coverage of household water resellers for four cities 
included in the AICD study ranges from 10 to 35 percent for the connected and from 15 to 50 percent for 
the unconnected. Evidence from case studies suggests that household water resellers can be as important 
as standpipes for the supply of the unconnected in Sub-Saharan cities. 
This market can represent a significant loss for the utility. Detailed analysis in a consumer assessment 
in five cities in Mozambique in 1996 showed that the estimated annual sales of water in Maputo totaled 
$3.2 million, of which $1.2 million could be attributed to formal house connections and yard tap sales and 
$1.5 million to yard tap owners who resell water to their neighbors (SAWA 1997; Keener and Banerjee 
2007). Thus, the sales volume in the informal resale market exceeded the size of the domestic consumer 
market, representing a benefit for yard tap owners and lost revenues for the water utility. Ironically, the 
other delivery vehicle for low-volume water sales, standposts, was also in a state of decline. In the much-
smaller secondary city of Quelimane, the size of the resale water market was constrained by very low and 
irregular supplies of network water. The approximate value of water sold per annum was $711,000, of 
which only 32 percent ($230,000) went to the water utility. As in Maputo, the largest source of sales from 
DRC (HCI)  Kinshasa  21 N/V 
Mozambique (MCI)  Maputo  58 0 
Rwanda (MCI)  Kigali  75  0 
Namibia (MCI)  Windhoek  100  100 
Lesotho (LCI)  Maseru (a)  48 100 
Kenya (LCI)  Nairobi  89  0 
Nigeria (LCI)  Kaduna  55  96 
Benin (LCI)  Cotonou  100  0 
Burkina Faso (LCI)  Ouagadougou  100  0 
Cape Verde (LCI)  Praia  100  0 
Niger (LCI)  Niamey  98  0 
Zambia (LCI)  Lusaka  97  0 
Malawi (LCI)  Blantyre  90  0 
Madagascar (LCI)  Antananarivo  82  40 
 Average  81  24 
Source: AICD WSS Survey, 2007. 
Note: Data obtained from independent studies have been highlighted. The 
remaining data come from utility and government sources. 
a. A negligible percentage of the standpipe/kiosk coverage is paid. 
LCI = low conflict index; MCI = medium conflict index. 
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water in the informal market came from the resale of yard tap water, accounting for estimated annual 
sales of more than $400,000. Standpost sales generated roughly $60,000 in sales; with less than $8,000 
received by the water company in revenues. In Maputo, residents with yard taps were able to resell this 
water for 219 percent of the price they paid for it, and in Quelimane water was re-sold for 686 percent of 
the purchase price (see below). 
Household water resellers often provide a competitive service preferred by consumers over 
standpipes, though this depends also on relative pricing. In some cases, household resellers offer a 
“middle” level of service between a full house connection and a standpipe. Household water resellers are 
also common in cities where the distance between standpipes is too large or the usage (in terms of people 
per standpipe) too high, as in Dakar, Abidjan, Conakry, and Addis Ababa (Hall 2002; Kariuki and others 
2003; Lauria and others 2005; Boyer 2007; O’Connor 2007). Certain studies indicate that there are 
several additional reasons why households may prefer to choose to buy water from their neighbor instead 
of using the standpipe. Neighbors can offer more convenient hours of operation and a better water 
pressure level; because neighbors are located close by, less time is needed to collect the water. In 
addition, neighbors may offer more flexible payment mechanisms than either public standpipes or one’s 
own house connection (Maputo: SAWA 1997; Boyer 2007; Accra: Sarpong and Abrampah 2006; 
Maseru: Hall 2002; Abidjan, Cotonou, Conakry, Kampala, and Yaouandé: Kariuki and others 2003; 
Dakar: Brocklehurst and Janssens 2004; Blantyre: Chirwa and Junge 2007; O’Connor 2007).  
Certain neighborhood types are fertile for household resale, such as insecure, high-density slum areas. 
Households in high crime areas tend to prefer purchase of water from household resellers because they 
want to avoid going out after dark. Moreover, public standposts in such areas are more likely to have been 
vandalized, and no longer functional.  
In some instances, resales from household connections are linked to deterioration in standpipe 
service. The low quality of standpipe service comes from poor maintenance by the utility, or the delegated 
manager, but also from illegal connections of standpipe lines. For instance, in inner peri-urban areas of 
Maputo and Dar es Salaam, low pressure and shortages at the standpipes are associated with illegal 
connections. Most of the illegal connections are made in the periphery of the network where the water 
pressure is usually the lowest, thus further degrading the water pressure of standpipes, which are often 
located near the ends of the network (SAWA 1997; Kjellén 2006).  Low pressure adds to waiting time at 
standpipes and makes the purchase from neighbor’s yard taps more competitive. In Maseru, Lesotho, a 
similar pattern occurred in terms of the decline in standpipes relative to household resellers; there 
standpipe coverage fell from an estimated 66 percent to 16 percent (Hall 2002) of the urban population, 
while household water resellers provided water to 31 percent of the urban population and to almost half of 
the unconnected population. In Maputo’s inner peri-urban areas, the standpipe system suffers from the 
most acute maintenance problems, and thus household reseller coverage can be as high as 69 percent of 




Although mobile vendors do not represent a significant source of water for the unconnected in most 
African countries, they do serve a significant portion of urban households in some African countries.
11 For 
two-thirds of the African countries surveyed, less than 1 percent of the urban population reports that they 
purchase from vendors, although, as noted, this likely represents only a portion of the informal water 
market. There are exceptions, however. In Mauritania, 32 percent of urban residents purchase water from 
mobile vendors, and in Khartoum, 60 percent of the population is served by water tankers. Cities in 
Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Tanzania also had more than 5 percent of households reporting 
they were dependent on vendors. The estimates of coverage are based on household surveys or calculated 
indirectly to determine coverage from the sources. The literature shows little quantitative data on the 
different ways water carters get their water and their different prices. Water vendors often provide water 
to communities situated a long distance from the network and to informal settlements where private 
connections and standpipes have not been installed (Kariuki and others 2003). 
Water truckers often supply mostly upper- and middle-income households. They are especially 
present in cities where the piped water service is very poor, both in terms of reliability and extension of 
the network, such as in Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, and Kampala. Half of the cities considered in the study 
have mobile distribution for water, but coverage is relatively limited to a small percentage of the 
population, from 0.24 percent to 6.5 percent (see table 1.3). In other cities, such as Accra and Luanda, 
water tankers supply directly to upper- and middle-income households but also play a key role in the 
supply chain. Due to the limited extension of the piped water network, a great part of the kiosks depend 
on water supplied by tankers. In fact, in informal settlements of Accra, 70 percent of the water bought in 
kiosks comes from water tankers (Sarpong and Abrampah 2006). In the case of Luanda in the mid- to 
late-1990s, the majority of the population (between 70 and 100 percent) living in peri-urban areas 
purchased water from water vendors that sold from household water tanks usually filled by water tankers 
(Development Workshop 1995). 
Small-scale independent providers 
There are small secondary water networks operated by small-scale independent providers (SSIPs) in 
almost 40 percent of the cities in the study. These may be connected to the main city network, as in 
Nairobi, Cotonou, and Abidjan, or completely separate from the city network, as in Kampala, Nairobi, 
and Maputo. However, the coverage of small secondary water networks is in general low—only 12 
percent in Maputo and 9 percent in Nairobi (table 4). Those that are not connected to the utility’s network, 
but rather to independent boreholes, are referred to here as “independent standpipes/kiosks.” These have 
emerged in peri-urban areas that are less densely populated and often out of reach of the utility’s water 
network. Although they are not prevalent in any African city, independent standpipes/kiosks appear to be 
one of the fastest-growing segments of the informal water market.
12 This source often offers consumers a 
                                                 
11 Although not specified in the DHS, this category is often associated with mobile water sources. 
12 Of 19 AICD cities, 8 reported some standpipes connected to independent systems. In five cities (Maputo, Nairobi, 
Kaduna, Maseru, and Lusaka), this service caters to a minority of the overall urban population. In Kinshasa, Dar es 
Salaam, and Khartoum all or most standposts use groundwater that is independent from the utility network. PROVISION OF WATER TO THE POOR IN AFRICA 
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good quality service because it is not constrained by network hours of supply and often offers good water 
pressure and more flexible hours, albeit at a higher price than standpipes connected to the network that are 
managed by community organizations or local leaders (Maputo: SAL 2007; Dar es Salaam: Materu and 
Mkanga 2006). It would be useful to have data on the coverage provided by each modality (i.e. connected 
to the main network vs. independent from the main network) in order to assess the future potential of each 
option. It would be equally interesting to have information on the income level of the households 
currently covered by this source. 
Case study of the evolution of water sources: Mozambique 
The case of Mozambique provides an interesting example of how various segments of the water 
market interact over time. In Maputo and several other cities in Mozambique, periodic surveys of the 
water market were carried out over a 10 year period in tandem with its water sector reform. First, a 2006 
consumer assessment confirmed that poorer peri-urban households were more likely to depend on higher-
priced re-sold yard tap water and on standposts. The assessment grouped households into poverty 
quintiles using standard factor analysis of 21 variables of household assets and indicators of wealth 
(figure 1.3).
  
Second, the series of consumer assessments showed that the number of people reliant on formal house 
and yard tap connections has continued to decline since 1996  to a low of 23 percent of peri-urban 
residents’ primary water source. However, because of long-term improvements in the financial and 
management aspects of the utility (currently under a lease contract), in recent years the sector has made 
improvements to bulk water supply, thus increasing the availability of water in urban systems. The 
utilities have also been able to attract funding and are about to undertake a large new wave of network 
expansion, which should have a substantial impact on these figures. 
Between 2001 and 2006, independent providers who supply small piped systems connected to 
boreholes (SSIPs) increased their market share to 23 percent from 9 percent, largely in the outer peri-
urban areas where use of standpost water has also declined (figure 1.4).
13 Consumers reported that SSIPs 
provided a very efficient service and responded more quickly for a request for a connection than did the 
utility, Aguas de Maputo. On the other hand, SSIPs were priced higher than some other sources and out of 
reach of the lower quintiles. Purchases from neighbors’ taps continued to grow, accounting for 26 percent 
of peri-urban water sources. 
 
                                                 
13 Data are also available for 1996. However, because the 1996 data also included a center urban area that was not 
included in the later surveys, the 2001 and 2006 surveys provide a better comparison. 
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Source: Thompson, SAL Consultants 2007. 
Note: Includes Maputo and adjacent areas of Matola and Boane. 
 
Figure 1.4   Primary water source in peri-urban Maputo, 2001 and 2006 
 
Source: Thompson, SAL Consultants 2007. 
 
The assessments also provided an indication of how prices have varied over time (figure 1.5). While 
those with connections to the utility (AdeM) saw increases of 340 percent in prices over the five-year 
period from 2001 to 2006, the price for household resale only increased by 223 percent (figure 1.6).  PROVISION OF WATER TO THE POOR IN AFRICA 
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Source: Thompson, SAL Consultants 2007. 
 
Finally, by dissagregating the different types of peri-urban neighborhoods by social, water, and 
density characteristics, one can see that in the outer peri-urban areas where the utility’s piped network did 
not reach, SSIPs quickly filled the gap (table 1.5), while in inner peri-urban (slum) areas, purchases from 




Table 1.5   Maputo water source by type of peri-urban area, 2006  
Percent; N = 600 







Formal household connection  30  30  2 
SSIP connection  1  8  31 
Neighbors tap/other neighborhood  36  30  6 
Public standpipe  22  13  7 
SSIP standpipe  6  8  25 
Private well/borehole (neighbors)  4  5  14 
Own well/borehole  1  7  10 
Public handpump (on well/borehole)    0  7 
Total 100  100  100 
Source: Thompson, SAL Consultants (2007). PROVISION OF WATER TO THE POOR IN AFRICA 
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2    Management of the unconnected water market 
There has been much debate on how management arrangements for public standpipes and kiosks 
affect the final retail price, the quality of service, payment to the utility, and the proper functioning of the 
standpipe, but data gaps remain. Information on the success of management models for standposts and 
kiosks is still based on individual case studies and anecdotes. Cross-country primary research on the 
effectiveness of different management models under different conditions is needed in order to draw more 
definitive conclusions.  
There are many variations on how public standpipes are managed and who retains responsibility for 
payment, supervision, and maintenance (table 3.1). However, management systems tend to fall into two 
general patterns where: (i) the utility retains control; or (ii) the utility delegates various functions to third 
parties and serves primarily as a bulk water supplier.
 14 In a little more than one-quarter of the cities 
studied, utility staff retains responsibility for managing standpipes along one of three management models 
(free, pre-payment, or managed by a paid utility staff member). In almost three-quarters of the cases, 
utilities had entered into a contract with a third party (whether a private individual or a community 
organization) or with a support institution (local government, CBO or NGO) for management of the 
standpipe.
15 
Direct management by utilities 
Standpipes have been directly managed by utilities in three ways: free of charge, attended, and 
prepaid (figure 3.1). 
In the last three decades, there has been a shift from standpipes owned and managed free of charge by 
the utility to standpipes run either by private individuals or community groups, and kiosks that are 
privately or community owned. The data reveal that free standpipes are declining, largely because they 
are viewed by many utilities as transaction-intensive and a financial drain. As a result, among the sample 
cities only five (27 percent) still had standpipes free of charge.  
With the exception of Madagascar, for which less than half the standpipes provide free water, free 
public standpipes were mostly concentrated in larger piped systems or cities with sufficient levels of 
piped coverage to cross subsidize the costs—in South Africa, Namibia, Lesotho, and Nigeria. Further, 
other cities are moving towards paid standpipes or kiosks, except for Kaduna, Nigeria; the cities of 
Johannesburg, Maseru, and Windhoek are installing prepaid standpipes, and Antananarivo is installing 
kiosks.  
                                                 
14 In the majority of Sub-Saharan cities, the utility follows one of these two models. There are examples of kiosks 
that are both owned and operated by private individuals that use utility water, as in Nairobi and Blantyre (Oenga and 
Kuria 2006;Chirwa and Junge 2007) or that are owned and operated by community groups, as in Dakar 
(Brocklehurst and Janssens 2004). However, these are largely the exceptions. 
15 In about half of the AICD cities, more than one management model was being used, either because one model is 
in the process of being replaced by another (Lesotho for example) or because of heterogeneous areas demanding 
different management approaches.  PROVISION OF WATER TO THE POOR IN AFRICA 
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 The second model, in 
which the utility directly hires a 
salaried attendant, is an 
increasingly uncommon 
practice still in use in a few 
countries (3 out of 18 sampled). 
This model has been rejected in 
some countries because 
experience has shown that there 
is limited incentive for a wage-
earning employee to ensure 
cost-recovery. In Zambia, the 
utility has tried to improve this 
model by introducing water 
commissions.  
Pre-paid electronic 
standpipes have no on-site 
manager, and are intended to 
reduce management costs. 
Lower management costs 
should reduce costs to the 
consumer and avoid the 
politically charged problem of 
non-payment and consequent 
need to shut standpipes down. A pre-paid system also has the potential to provide more targeted subsidies, 
as the tokens for pre-payment can be distributed via existing safety net systems. Electronic pre-payment 
cards and vending machines are currently in use in South Africa and are being introduced in Lesotho and 
Namibia. In Zambia, as an alternative to vending machines, tokens or monthly cards are used. These 
systems allow for tariffs to be set at a unit rate that is lower than the smallest coin (Kariuki and others 
2003; Brocklehurst 2004) and may allow for more efficient transmission of prices as they eliminate the 
middleman. In Lesotho, the water utility sells the pre-paid cards, which are also sold at retail outlets. In 
some instances, however, self-styled “operators” set up at the standpipes and offered higher priced tokens; 
while this can provide a convenience to some customers, information dissemination on formal prices and 
formal outlets is important.  
Table 2.1    Modes of standpipe management 










South Africa  Johannesburg  100  0  100  0 
Namibia Windhoek  100  0  100  0 
Lesotho Maseru  100  0  97  3 
Zambia Lusaka  0  5  90 5 
Madagascar Antananarivo  40  60  0  40 
Nigeria Kaduna  96  4  96 0 
Cape Verde  Praia  0  0  100  0 
Sudan Great  Khartoum  0  0  100 0 
Private  
Benin Cotonou  0  100  0  0 
Burkina Faso  Ouagadougou  0  100  0  0 
Niger Niamey  0  100  0  0 
Rwanda Kigali  0  100  0  0 
Kenya Nairobi  0  88  0  12 
Senegal Dakar  0  85  0 15 
Community  
Mozambique Maputo  0  44  0  56 
Ethiopia  Addis  Ababa  0 0 0 100 
Malawi  Blantyre  0 N/V N/V  70 
* In the community category we merge the delegated management model with direct 
contracting with a community group and the delegated management model with institution 
support as discussed later in this section. 
Source: AICD WSS Survey, 2007. PROVISION OF WATER TO THE POOR IN AFRICA 
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Figure 3.1   Utility direct management models 
 
The delegated management model 
In the increasingly common delegation model for public standpipes (figure 3.2), utilities either sign a 
contract directly with a standpipe operator, who maintains responsibility for paying the standpipe bill (and 
in some cases for maintaining the standpipe), or they sign a contract with a support institution. In the 
support institution model, the operators are then supervised by members of a water committee or 
supervised directly by local officials. The utility issues a bill for each standpipe at a bulk water price that 
is paid by the institution in the institution support model. In most of the cities studied, even though the 
water provided at the standpipes is subsidized, this subsidy does not reach the final consumers, who pay 
several times the subsidized rate. The selection processes for standpipe operators typically involves a 
community-level group or a local government representative, and is generally far from transparent, 
subject in many cases to local political influence. 
Existing case studies suggest that, over the medium-term, the delegation model has had very mixed 
results in terms of providing a reliable service with timely bill payment to the utility; in terms of 
providing a subsidized or “social” price to the end-consumer, as the next chapter will show, it has by and 
large not been effective. The cases that have been most successful have involved sufficient utility (or 
external) oversight and monitoring, thus adding to the costs of administering the schemes. Conversely, 
where the utility has delegated all aspects (management, monitoring, maintenance, oversight), it has often 
been at the cost of higher consumer prices, and break-downs in service. There are exceptions, particularly 
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Figure 3.2    Delegated management models 
 
 
Another important disincentive to payment of standpipe fees is that standpipes receive less attention 
from the utility. In Maputo, standpipes account for less than 1 percent of total water consumption from 
the utility and less than 0.5 percent of total revenues for the utility (Boyer 2007). For certain cities with 
available data, we find similar low percentages for the utility’s market share. In Dakar and Addis Ababa, 
standpipes account for 6.4 percent and 8 percent of total revenues respectively (Boyer 2007; AICD WSS 
database). The fact that standpipes comprise a small percentage of the utility business, together with the 
highly polititical reaction to shutting down the operation of standpipes when bills are unpaid, creates 
incentives for utilities to focus their attention on increasing their revenue base through better maintenance 
and improved billing collection from household connections. In some other cities, utilities informally 
admit to rationing water to standpipes in order to minimize losses.  
Community-based management  
Local leaders: There are wide variations on how communities and their representatives are involved 
in standpipe management and oversight. In some cases, utilities have assumed that local leaders will 
represent the broader public interest of their communities, and have handed over responsibility for 
operations and maintenance to these leaders (in parts of Maputo, Blantyre, Addis Ababa, and Dar es 
Standpipe operator* 
Utility 
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Ethiopia, Malawi and Tanzania 
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Salaam). In these cases, performance of the standpost in terms of pricing, maintenance, timely bill 
payment and so forth, is largely a function of local social context, the skills in financial management and 
legitimacy of the local leader and the degree of oversight by an external party. In many cases, utility staff 
does not have the skills or personnel with time to assess these issues up-front, nor to monitor them 
sufficiently.  
Management by Community Organizations: In an effort to improve the accountability of 
standpipe/kiosk operators towards consumers, several schemes have implicated community organizations 
in management or oversight, and have been somewhat more effective than schemes that simply delegate 
management to a local leader. This is still very limited in urban and peri-urban areas of sub-Saharan 
countries and in those cases where there is not enough social cohesion, strong local power structures, and 
no oversight from a supporting institution, the model can also lead to corruption and mismanagement. In 
Blantyre and Lilongwe, community managed kiosks that had been developed with extensive community 
involvement were captured by local elites as soon as the mediating NGO left. In another case in Dar es 
Salaam, pricing policies did not cover standpost operation and maintenance, and voluntary community 
contributions (in kind or in cash) do not bridge the gap.  
The principle of community pressure only works where there is a mutually recognized sense of 
“community” and where there is personal security and common social values in confronting those who 
digress. Unlike rural areas, urban areas exhibit a greater degree of heterogeneity among different types of 
neighborhoods. Residents in some neighborhoods – for example in the outskirts of a city - may retain a 
sense of belonging to a community, know their neighbors, share social norms that can create “community 
pressure,”;  in many other inner urban or core slum neighborhoods, residents may come from different 
ethnic or geographic areas and live in the area for a short time, without any of the social bonds that 
contribute to social capital, and face crime and insecurity that causes them to refrain from confronting 
someone who may not have managed a standpipe well. In such areas, information also may not circulate 
sufficiently on the accountability arrangements for a standpipe. In such areas, it is not clear that a 
designated “community” leader is accountable to any wider public. 
Political economy issues are central to many problems both with standpipe payment and with 
selection of who manages and captures revenues from standpipes. An example of the types of 
implementation challenges experienced with schemes involving communities and their designated leaders 
can be found in Maputo, Mozambique. In Maputo, communities would elect a neighborhood water 
commission which would, in turn, elect a caretaker for a standpipe responsible for maintenance of the 
water points, together with the collection of the consumers’ payments. Although designed to be apolitical, 
local party structures in Mozambique are very strong, and some local leaders have ensured that they are 
represented in these commissions that are ultimately responsible for payment to the utilities. Many local 
officials interfered in the operation of the standpipes to an extent that far exceeded a mere oversight role. 
Since the utility encounters strong political opposition to shutting down a standpipe with a large account 
in arrears, non-payment of standpipe bills is very common. Local officials have an incentive to develop 
rent-seeker behaviours, for they can keep the money collected by the standpipe attendant, pay the 
attendant a small stipend and then withhold payment to the utility because they know that the utility will 
not close the standpipe. One study found that bill collection rates in Maputo were only 37 percent in 2002 
and 44 percent in 2003 (Boyer 2007). As a result, few public standposts had ever had repairs, and many PROVISION OF WATER TO THE POOR IN AFRICA 
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have fallen into different levels of degradation. Similarly, in slum areas of Luanda, Angola, in the 1990s, 
where the informal price of water was extremely high, there were reports in some areas that local party 
leaders had taken over the revenue collection at standpipes to provide capital for local party activities.  
In schemes that have experienced problems, information dissemination to the broader community or 
consumers is often lacking. At the same time, community pressure only works when there is sufficient 
information dissemination. In the Mozambique case, a 2006 assessment confirmed that: (a) the majority 
of consumers did not know who water committee members were; (b) few consumers had a clear idea of 
the roles and responsibilities of the local structures for standpipe management and oversight; (c) and 
consumers generally played no role in the selection of management structures.  
Experience with schemes involving community organizations varies across countries and depends on 
the degree of social cohesion of the community, management capacity in the community and external 
monitoring. A WSP Report on the role of small and medium-size organizations providing water in urban 
areas stressed the limitations of community-based management models without enough external 
monitoring and support as: i) there is a tendency to minimize expenses by limiting the extension of the 
system; ii) although in principle based on the voluntary participation of members of the community to 
reduce operating and maintenance costs, actual management is often controlled by a small group that may 
not be representative of all the users and that monopolizes control of the finances (Vézina 2002). With 
such arrangements, elite capture remains a problem that requires strong institutional controls, and active 
monitoring. 
Some more recent models for community involvement integrate more sophisticated incentives, and 
monitoring to mitigate corruption by larger water user associations or NGOs. In Blantyre, Malawi, water 
users associations (WUAs) control as many as 70 water points each. The utility provides technical 
assistance, legally registers the WUA, and monitors operation of the standpost. The WUA employs both 
the kiosk attendants and meter inspectors. The latter check the meter readings; if there is a difference 
between the meter reading from the inspector and the amount of revenue collected, it is subtracted from 
the attendant’s salary. Although the price of this water is 25 percent higher than at other kiosks, because 
the quality of service is monitored and reliable, households prefer to purchase from these kiosks than 
from their neighbors. This is not the case with other neighborhoods with kiosks. In Senegal (Dakar), 
about 15 percent of the public standposts were built through a partnership between the utility and NGO 
(Enda Tiers Monde). ENDA works with communities and local neighborhood associations (women’s 
groups, self-help groups), and arranges for them to pay 25 percent of the capital costs of a standpipe 
which is built by the utility. Once operational, the utility bills a standpost operator selected by the 
community, and ENDA assists in the creation of a local water council. 
Private management 
Utilities also contract out the operation and management of standpipes to private managers on the 
premise that commercial management promotes efficiency and cost-recovery and avoids some of the 
implementation challenges noted above, but experience has also been mixed. Many utilities in African 
cities such as Cotonou, Ouagadougou, Niamey, Kigali, Nairobi, Dakar, Quelimane and Blantyre have 
leased their installations to private operators and sold the operators bulk water. There are two particular PROVISION OF WATER TO THE POOR IN AFRICA 
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weaknesses of the model: the poor transparency of the selection procedures for the standpipe operators, 
particularly when the municipality is involved in choosing the manager; and the lack of monitoring efforts 
by the water utility in collecting water revenues, ensuring good quality service and maintaining adequate 
tariff levels.  
 Privately managed standpipes tend to be better 
maintained (in working order) than those managed under 
alternative schemes (table 2.2) but they are more expensive 
for consumers. However, because of issues with utility 
reporting and the sample size, this finding is not conclusive.
 
The estimation problem arises as utilities may over-estimate 
the number of properly working standpipes/kiosks if these are 
not regularly monitored.  
This model is dependent on regular hours of supply and 
pressure of water to the standpipe by the utility. In the 1990s in Quelimane, Mozambique, private 
standpipe operators were invoiced according to fixed estimates of water consumption, but water supply 
was extremely limited and intermittent. Certain standpipe operators found it difficult to generate enough 
water revenues to pay back the water bill and did not have funds for adequate maintenance of the 
standpipes (SAWA 1997). 
 
Table 2.2    Type of standpipe/kiosk 
management and percentage in good 
working condition 
Standpipe / kiosk 
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3    Analysis of water prices, costs, and regulation 
The range for prices of water by service provider goes from 1.3 times the utility price for small piped 
networks to 10 to 20 times the utility price for mobile distributors (table 3.1). Standpipe prices include 
“formal”rates by the utility which differ from “retail” prices (referred to here as “informal” prices) faced 
by the consumer when there is a delegated management model. 










Country Largest city (US$/m3)* (US$/m3) (US$/m3) (US$/m3) (US$/m3) (US$/m3)
Benin Cotonou 0.41 N/A 1.91 1.91 N/A N/A
Burkina Faso Ouagadougou 0.90 N/A 0.48 N/A N/A 1.67
Ethiopia Addis Ababa 0.19 N/A 0.87 1.44 3.85 N/V
Mozambique Maputo 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.98 N/A N/V
Niger Niamey 0.52 N/A 0.48 N/A N/A 1.79
Nigeria Kaduna 0.17 N/A N/V N/V 3.43 5.71
Rwanda Kigali 0.44 N/A 1.79 1.79 4.48 N/A
Senegal Dakar 0.37 N/A 1.53 N/V N/A 2.29
South Africa Johannesburg 0.05 N/A N/A N/A N/V N/V
DRC Kinshasa 0.05 2.11 1.02 1.01 N/A N/A
Ghana Accra 0.52 N/A 5.51 1.53 5.46 6.89
Kenya Nairobi 0.18 0.60 1.73 N/A 3.74 3.47
Lesotho Maseru 0.40 N/A 2.58 N/V N/V N/V
Malawi Blantyre 0.12 N/A 1.16 3.38 N/A N/A
Namibia Windhoek 1.45 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Sudan Great Khartoum 0.37 N/A 1.15 N/V 4.32 3.00
Zambia Lusaka 0.56 N/A 1.67 N/V N/A 3.00
Cape Verde Praia 2.67 N/A 9.44 N/A 9.67 11.38
Chad N'Djamena 0.22 N/V N/V N/V N/A N/V
Cote d'Ivoire Abidjan 0.04 N/V 0.93 1.82 N/A 3.35
Madagascar Antananarivo 0.11 0.47 1.24 N/V N/A 2.33
Tanzania Dar es Salaam 0.39 N/V 0.87 0.98 2.40 2.56
Uganda Kampala 0.25 N/A 1.40 1.40 N/V 4.50
Average 0.49 1.04 1.93 1.63 4.67 4.00
Median 0.37 0.79 1.24 1.49 4.08 3.00
Min 0.04 0.47 0.48 0.98 2.40 1.67
Max 2.67 2.11 9.44 3.38 9.67 11.38
Overprice** 2.14 3.36 4.02 11.03 8.11
* 4 m3 / month
** Price SSIP/HH connection
Source: AICD WSS database, Other  
Note: Data from 23 cities. Standpipe price is the “retail” otherwise referred to as informal price paid by the consumer at the tap. 
Standpipes 
In almost three quarters of the sampled cities,
16 utilities had set a formal/wholesale standpipe price 
below the unit price for those with house connections, implying a “social” tariff or tariff reflective of the 
lower level of service.
17 Only in Sudan, Madagascar, Tanzania and Ghana did utilities have a standpipe 
rate that was above that of household connection water.  
                                                 
16 Analysis based on data from 9 cities. 
17 For this analysis it was assumed average household consumption of 10 M3 for house connections (60 l/c/d). PROVISION OF WATER TO THE POOR IN AFRICA 
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While standpipe water appears to be cross-subsidized by utilities, only in a minority of cases does this 
subsidy reach the ultimate water consumers. In 89 percent of the sample cities, the informal or retail 
standpipe unit price exceeded that for house connections (figures 3.1 and 3.2), in some cases by a large 
degree—as in Kinshasa, where consumers pay over 20 times the formal price. Thus the social tariff has 
not, by and large, been effective at reaching the end-consumer, who pays a median of three times the 
“wholesale” or formal price of water to the standpipe. 
18  
The cases of Burkina Faso and Niger are worth further exploration, as these were the only two 
countries (out of 18) that appear to have a social tariff that reaches the actual consumer (see figure 3.1). A 
social tariff is defined here as a retail/informal standpipe price that is below the unit price for water from a 
household connection. Key analysis should include both the management structures, incentives for these 
schemes, as well as the financial impact on the utilities themselves. 
Figure 3.1   Comparative water price from household connection vs. from standpipe 
 
Source: AICD WSS database 2007. 
Note: Unit price household connection based on assumption 10m3 consumption per household per month. 
 
In most cases, the utility sets a formal/wholesale price for standpipes that is below the price for house 
connections (table 3.2). The differential, or cross-subsidy, amounts to between $0.19 million per annum 
to $1.3 million per annum per country. In many cases, a significant percentage of this cross-subsidy is 
used by the standpipe operator. 
In the case of standpipes / kiosks that depend on the utility’s water, the literature suggests that the 
underlying causes for higher informal tariffs are not driven by high operation and maintenance costs, but 
are, in some cases, linked to high profits (Whittington 1991; CollignonandVézina 2000; Brocklehurst and 
Janssens 2004; Gulyani and others 2005; Boyer 2007). The main reasons for this situation are as follows: 
(a) low operating and maintenance costs due to inadequate maintenance of the standpipes; (b) low water 
costs due to the existence of “social” tariffs subsidized by the government; (c) underpayment of water 
                                                 
18 Where there is a standpipe manager, the formal price refers to the wholesale price that the manager pays to the 
utility; where the utility takes care of operations and maintenance, the formal price is the suggested price. PROVISION OF WATER TO THE POOR IN AFRICA 
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bills to the utility; (c) low level of regulations / enforcement of formal and subsidized tariffs; (d) social 
factors (degree of community cohesion, community pressure or lack thereof, high crime).  
















































Due to the combined factors of high informal prices and large population coverage by standpipes, the 
total gross profit
19 captured by standpipe operators in economic terms is quite high. In the cities in which 
it could be estimated, the annual value of the gross profit ranges from $15,477 in Khartoum to almost $10 
million in Lusaka. In relative terms, the gross profit captured by the standpipe operator compared to water 
revenues of the utility can represent a significant percentage: Maputo 12 percent, Addis Ababa 44 percent 
and Lusaka 120 percent. Because there is a great variability in costs by country, further research is needed 
on the factors that affect why some operators charge the maximum the market will bear (which may lead 




                                                 
19 Gross Profit = Revenues from water sales – Cost of water sales. This calculation does not include OandM ,other 
overhead costs, taxes and financial costs PROVISION OF WATER TO THE POOR IN AFRICA 
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profit ($)  Conflict index 
Population coverage (%) 








Faso  Ouagadougou  0.51 0.42 0.50 0.48  0.9  0.76 1,278,002  -164,241  Low  34  61 
Niger Niamey  0.24 N/V N/V 0.48  2.0  0.36  191,293  375,635  Low  31  21 
Ethiopia Addis  Ababa  0.19 0.58 1.15 0.87  4.6  0.24  545,418 7,210,815  Medium  39  40 
Tanzania  Dar es 
Salaam  0.58 0.55 1.20 0.87  1.5  0.45  –109,102  250,715  Low  29  4 
Côte 
d'Ivoire  Abidjan  0.45 0.60 1.25 0.93  2.1  0.06      Low  65  N/V 
Mozam-
bique  Maputo  0.31 0.31 1.51 0.98  3.2  0.38  224,480 2,078,976  Medium  26  26 
DRC Kinshasa  0.05 N/V N/V 1.02  20.4  0.05      High  36  N/V 
Sudan  Great 
Khartoum  0.92 N/V N/V 1.15  1.3  0.37  –37,232  15,477  High  27  0.1 
Malawi Blantyre  0.29 0.63 1.48 1.16  4.0  0.29      Low  47  N/V 
Madagascar Antananarivo  0.14 N/V N/V 1.24  8.6  0.06 –394,068  5,360,254  Low  42  34 
Uganda Kampala  0.39 0.25 2.00 1.40  3.6  0.74  214,305  612,383  High  30  5 
Senegal Dakar  0.54 1.15 1.91 1.53  2.8  0.37  –614,036 3,608,063  Low  77  19 
Zambia Lusaka  0.19 N/V N/V 1.67  9.0  0.39  1,368,437  9,818,638  Low  27  58 
Kenya Nairobi  N/V 1.39 2.08 1.73  N/V  0.60      Low  51  41 
Rwanda Kigali  0.44 N/V N/V 1.79  4.1  0.50  201,407  4,937,298  Medium  35  51 
Benin Cotonou  0.41 0.50 2.50 1.91  4.7  0.63      Low  31  N/V 
Lesotho Maseru  N/A 1.48 3.69 2.58  N/A  0.43      Low  36  N/V 
Ghana Accra  3.64 N/V N/V 5.51  1.5  0.52      Low  56  N/V 
Cape Verde  Praia  N/V N/V N/V 9.44  N/V  3.09        Low  34  60 
  Average  0.58  0.71  1.75  1.93  4.64                 
  Median  0.40 0.58 1.51 1.24  3.40             
  Minimum  0.05    0.48  0.94             
  Maximum  3.64        9.44  20.40             
Source: AICD WSS database 2007. 
* Household connection at 10m3/month 
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Although numerous utilities and governments had made an effort to set a “retail” price for standpipe 
water, in general, the final “informal” price tends to be fixed by the manager of the standpipe. To better 
understand the underlying causes of the high standpipe prices, it is necessary to assess who acts as a 
price-setting agent (table 3.3). For standpipes and kiosks managed by private individuals or community 
groups, the price is primarily fixed by the kiosk manager or the community group respectively. In 
standpipes managed by utility staff, there is no principal actor setting the price. The number of standpipes 
managed directly by utility staff has been decreasing in all the cities studied and their relative weight is 
marginal.  
Table 3.3   Price setting in standpipes/kiosks
20 
 Price-setting  agent 
Management (% of countries)  Kiosk manager  Utility  Government  Community  Other  TOTAL 
Private individual   47  13  27  0  13  100 
Utility 0  14  29  29  29  100 
Community 0  11  22  67  0  100 
Source: AICD WSS database 2007.             
 
The delegated management contract model for public standpipes, used by close to three quarters of 
utilities studied, falls short in terms of effective regulation of standpipe prices. Under this model, 
individual standpipes are directly regulated by local authorities or community groups and indirectly 
regulated by the utility or the water regulator agency. It is generally acknowledged that both the regulator 
and local officials lack the capacity, resources and incentives to regulate and monitor this activity. There 
is evidence of the lack of standpipe control in many cities, including the following: Dakar; Addis Ababa; 
Maputo; Kampala; Maseru; and Dar es Salaam.  
Household water resellers
21   
In general, household water resellers emerge largely as a result of malfunctioning or absent 
standpipes, or because of high connection costs. In two-thirds of the cities studied, the informal household 
reseller price is similar to the informal price for standpipes (figure 3.3). However, two cities are 
exceptions to this trend– Accra and Blantyre – because of supply-chain specificities. The vast majority of 
kiosks in Accra are supplied by water tankers; they have to pass-through the cost of the transport by water 
tankers. Discounting this cost, the water price of a household reseller is quite similar to the standpipe 
informal price. In Blantyre, certain parts of the city experience a huge increase in the price of water due to 
restrictions on the supply side. A couple of years ago, the price of water from the household resellers was 
equal to the informal price of the standpipes (Chriwa and Junge 2007). 
                                                 
20 Analysis based on data from 15 cities. 
21 Analysis based on data from 9 cities. PROVISION OF WATER TO THE POOR IN AFRICA 
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Cost of water tanker
 
Source: AICD WSS database 2007. 
 
The average household water reseller sells water at three times its cost (table 3.4). This generally 
covers the cost of water sold, plus their own consumption, and in some cases provides a small amount of 
extra income. Household water resellers face an increasing block tariff (IBT) in most of the countries 
studied, and can be charged a high tariff even if the final costumers are low-income households 
(Whittington 1992; Collignon and Vézina 2000). It is not clear whether increasing block tariffs (IBT) are 
hurting the poor by increasing water costs of household resellers. In many countries, the IBT has defined 
large “social” blocks in terms of consumption, and the difference between the prices paid by the different 
blocks is small (Komives and others 2005; Banerjee and others 2007). 
22 As some utilities have not kept 
pace with metered consumption, but rather charge based on flat or estimated rates, the volume of water 
sold through household resale can represent a significant loss of income for the utility (as the case in 
Mozambique illustrated). In these cases (as in Maputo), the household reseller can make a substantial 
profit. 
Payment mechanisms to household resellers include monthly payment schemes, as well as payment 
by bucket. Case studies point to the importance of personal relations and mutual trust in determining 
which scheme is used, but also in determining prices. In Maputo, Mozambique, 40 percent of household 
resellers had monthly payment agreements; standpipe managers started to offer such schemes to 
customers also in order to compete with household resale (Thompson, SAL consultants, 2007). 
                                                 
22 In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, the resale of water by household consumers is a regulated activity, and therefore there 
is a record of the average amount sold per reseller, which is 40m3/month (Kariuki and others 2003). This level of 
consumption, which represents 5 people per household consuming 40 l/c/d (6.7 households/household reseller), is 
the one used for estimation of the water costs of the household reseller. 
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An important area for future research relates to how formal water tariffs and quality (hours of service) 
affect the household resale market. If policy makers increase prices in the formal sector in an effort to 
make pricing more equitable, this may harm the lower income purchaser of household resale water more 
than the seller. At the same time, if the utility improved hours of supply and pressure of water, and if the 
resale market is competitive, this could serve to lower prices, particularly where there are flat or estimated 
payments on household connections. The one case providing time series data on this is in Maputo, 
Mozambique. In Maputo, the unit price of water from a household connection had increased by 340 
percent between 2001 and 2006, but the price increase from household resale increased by only 223 
percent. While the formal price of water had increased over this period, many of those with yard taps who 
were reselling water continued to be metered on estimated (likely lower than actual) consumption. 
Table 3.4   Prices charged by formal and informal standpipes / kiosks and by household water resellers  
City 





Rate  Min Max  Average  Min Max  Average 
(US$/m3)  (US$/m3) (US$/m3) (US$/m3) (inf/for) (US$/m3) (US$/m3) (US$/m3) (US$/m3) (inf/cost) 
Addis Ababa  0.19  0.58 1.15 0.87  4.6  0.36  1.2  1.7  1.44 4.0 
Cotonou  0.41  N/V N/V 1.91  4.7  0.79 N/V N/V 1.91 2.4 
Accra  3.64  N/V N/V 5.51  1.5  0.63 N/V N/V 1.53 2.4 
Abidjan  0.45  0.60 1.25 0.93  2.1  0.53  1.5  2.1  1.82 3.5 
Maputo  0.31  0.31 1.51 0.98  3.2  0.62  0.6  1.1  0.98 1.6 
Blantyre  0.29  0.63 1.48 1.16  4.0  0.51  0.8  8.4  3.38 6.6 
Kampala  0.39  0.25 2.00 1.40  3.6  0.67 N/V  N/V 1.40 2.1 
Kigali  0.44  N/V N/V 1.79  4.1  0.63 N/V N/V 1.79 2.9 
Dar es 
Salaam  0.58  0.55 1.20 0.87  1.5  0.50  0.8  1.2  0.98 2.0 
Average  0.74  0.49 1.43 1.71  3.24  0.58 0.99 2.92 1.69 3.05 
Median  0.41  0.56 1.36 1.16  3.63  0.62 0.84 1.73 1.53 2.45 
Min  0.19 0.25  0.87  1.51  0.36  0.65  0.98  1.60 
Max 3.64    2.00  5.51  4.66  0.79    8.44  3.38  6.63 
Source: AICD WSS database 2007, other. 
* Household reseller cost is calculated using domestic tariff 40m3/month 
 
 
Reselling of water by households with private connections is commonly believed to be illegal in Sub-
Saharan cities (Collignon andVézina 2000; Kariuki 2003; Boyer 2007), but only 4 out of 15 cities in the 
study with prevalence of household water resellers
23 explicitly prohibit the resale of water by households 
(table 3.5). Only 3 cities have legalized household resale and require a permit for this business. In the 
majority of cases, a confusing legal limbo prevails; household water resellers are neither prohibited nor 
legalized. Even if regulations are in place prohibiting household water resellers, they are not enforced, as 
in Dakar or Dar es Salaam. Utilities and government simply do not control and rarely contest this 
practice, and in the case of Kampala the practice is encouraged in areas at the end of the network. 
Detailed case studies that highlight the importance of this source in allowing access where standposts or 
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individual connections have not kept pace point to the serious impact prohibition of this source would 
have on poor urban households. 
Given the coverage gap and the ready 
distribution system that household resellers provide, 
a valid question is whether to explore methods to 
partner with private households to increase 
coverage. Abidjan is one of the few cities with 
experience in attempting to regulate this sector, 
though they also the focus was on removing illegal 
connections; although the results have been 
disappointing because of a lack of incentives, there 
is still potential to explore better mechanisms for 
using this source. In the early 1980s, the utility 
SODECI and the national government decided to 
address the increasing growth of household water 
resellers that tapped in to illegal connections to the 
network. They would provide permits to the 
household water resellers as long as they converted 
their connections into formal ones. The expected 
outcomes were an increase in sales among the poor, 
a reduction in illegal activity and an improvement 
in revenue collection. The campaign did not 
provide any incentive to the resellers; they were 
billed as domestic customers and faced an 
increasing block tariff (IBT). Moreover, the water vendor was required to provide a title deed for the 
permit and to invest in an extension from the meter to the water point. As a result, only 1 percent of the 




Mobile distributors charge the highest prices among all the different water service providers. The 
water delivered by water tankers and carters costs between $2 and $8 per cubic meter. But the economic 
burden among the unconnected people in different cities is not evenly shared. There are cities where the 
lack of access to the network makes unconnected people heavily reliant on water tankers, as in Accra and 
Luanda, or heavily reliant on water vendors, as in Khartoum. Figure 3.4 presents a comparison of the 
prices of water tankers and water vendors in cities where data is available. There is little difference 
between the unit sale price of water tankers and water vendors, probably because of the strong 
competition between the two for the provision of water to certain types of clients. 
                                                 
24 Analysis based on data from 15 cities. 
Table 3.5   Regulation of household water resellers 
Country City  Prohibited  License   
Benin Cotonou  no  no 
Ethiopia Addis  Ababa  no  no 
Mozambique Maputo  no  no 
Nigeria Kaduna  yes N/A 
Rwanda Kigali  no  yes 
Senegal Dakar  yes  yes 
Lesotho Maseru N/V N/V 
Malawi Blantyre  N/V  N/V 
DRC Kinshasa  no  no 
Sudan Great  Khartoum  yes  no 
Zambia Lusaka no  no 
Ghana Accra  no no 
Chad N'Djamena  no  N/V 
Cote d'Ivoire  Abidjan  no  yes 
Madagascar Antananarivo  no  no 
Tanzania  Dar es Salaam  yes  no 
Uganda Kampala  no  no 
 %  yes  24  18 
Source: AICD WSS database 2007.    PROVISION OF WATER TO THE POOR IN AFRICA 
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Water vendors Water tankers
 
 
The high price charged by mobile distributors is 
generally justified by high transport costs. The 
literature reveals that carters do not yield large profits 
on the water that they sell; actually, the salaries that 
they earn are among the lowest in their cities 
(Collignon and Vézina 2000; Kariuki and others 
2003). Table 3.6 illustrates this reality in Accra, 
Khartoum and Luanda, where water supply systems 
for the unconnected are mainly based on mobile 
distributors, either as wholesalers or retailers. The 
profits that these distributors make are not very high; 
in the case of carters, sales are relatively low level, and carters barely make a subsistence salary. Even at 
zero profit, the water prices are very high in volumetric terms. 
Two of the places where there is a buoyant mobile water sector are in Luanda, Angola, and Accra, 
Ghana; in these cities, empirical studies show that the market is quite competitive. However, this does not 
necessarily imply low prices compared to other water service providers. Almost half of the cities that 
have water tankers in operation to supply water have regulations in place (table 3.7). 
The utility emerges as a minor player in the operation of water tankers. The formal and informal 
private sectors are the main operators in 4 out of 9 cities with water tanker supply. When the formal 
private sector is the main operator, the market is more competitive than when the informal sector is the 
main operator. These results should be taken with certain reservations because they are based on 
impressions by utility staff, and not necessarily based on empirical analysis.  
Table 3.6    Operating accounts for mobile 
distributors in three cities 
 Tanker  Vendor 
USD/m3  Luanda Accra Khartoum 
Sale Price  5.46  5.46  3.00 
Transport costs  3.85  4.09  1.53 
Water costs  0.44  0.55  0.84 
Profit 1.17  0.82  0.63 
Profit (% income)  21  15  21 
Source: For Luanda, Development Workshop 1995; for Accra, 
Sarpong and Abrampah 2006; for Khartoum, Gadir 2006.PROVISION OF WATER TO THE POOR IN AFRICA 
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Table 3.7   Regulation of water tankers 
Country City  Regulated  Regulated 
Ethiopia  Addis Ababa  yes  1 
Nigeria  Kaduna no  2 
Rwanda  Kigali no  2 
South Africa  Johannesburg no  2 
Ghana  Accra no  2 
Kenya  Nairobi yes  1 
Sudan  Great Khartoum  yes  1 
Cape Verde  Praia yes  1 
Chad  N'Djamena yes  1 
Tanzania  Dar es Salaam  no  2 
Uganda  Kampala no  2 
Source: AICD WSS database, 2007.    
Small piped networks 
The price charged by small piped networks is slightly higher than the prices charged by the utility for 
a household connection. In the cities studied, the prices charged by small piped networks range from 
$0.47/m3 in Madagascar to $2.11/m3 in the DRC. Since small piped networks are a relatively recent 
solution to inadequate water supply, less is known about the costs that they bear or their performance 
according to management by private individuals or by community groups. 
Half of the cities do not have regulations that control the number of boreholes or restrict the amount 
of water withdrawn from them. For those cities in which regulations exist, regulations are unclear or 
rarely enforced. As utilities expand service into peri-urban areas, they are likely to increasingly operate in 
areas where these boreholes and small piped networks exist, and the pressure is likely to grow to either 
put them under the purview of the utility or to regulate them. Although there are limited data, analysis of 
SPNs shows most of the cities do not regulate these activities. 
An indicator for measuring the distortion in the water sector  
Two main conclusions emerge from the overall price analysis. First, households without private 
connections or yard taps pay unit water prices significantly higher than those with these connections. 
Second, the prices for each water provider in the informal sector show a greater degree of variability than 
the prices for water offered by utilities to connected households. The standard deviation of the prices for 
each informal water service is 1.3 to 5 times higher than the price of water for connected households. 
There can be a great degree of variability in prices in different neighborhoods within the same city. Figure 
3.5 shows the price ranges by water provider. In the case of the standpipes/kiosks, the Cape Verde 
example is highlighted because its high price is directly related to its very specific water production 
system; the red mark represents the upper value from comparison cities. PROVISION OF WATER TO THE POOR IN AFRICA 
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Source: AICD WSS database 2007; other. 
 
The growing importance of the informal water market is forcing policymakers to assess the impact of 
their policies on this market segment both in terms of its coverage, but also in terms of how higher prices 
influence informal market prices and access to improved water. In countries where the formal sector 
water market is unable to keep pace with urban growth yet has low tariffs, and the informal market 
thrives, one might find a large distortion between the formal and the informal water price. At the same 
time, if a utility is not recovering costs because its formal tariffs are too low, it may be less able to keep 
pace with service expansion and one would expect the distortion to grow. In order to measure both the 
weight of the informal sector, and the degree to which its prices exceed those in the formal sector, one can 















Pi: End-user price of each water service provider (US$/m
3) 
Ci: coverage of each water service provider (percent) 
Pc: end-user price of residential customer 10m
3 (US$/m
3) 
i: type of water service provider 
Since the overall WAIO applies to all water service providers, including the household connections 
provided by the utility, the calculation indicates the total disruption at the city or urban level. It can be PROVISION OF WATER TO THE POOR IN AFRICA 
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hypothesized that efficient coverage and functioning of formal networks is associated with lower informal 
prices (figures 3.6 and 3.7). The burden of service disruption is unequally shared between the connected 
and the unconnected households, because connected households enjoy the low price charged by the 
utility, whereas the unconnected have to face the high prices associated with the rest of suppliers. For this 
reason, if one wants to assess how distorted the market is for the unconnected versus the connected, the 
WAIO can also be calculated just for the unconnected population.
 25 






















































Source: AICD WSS database 2007. 
                                                 




The median value of the total WAIO varies between 2 and 2.7 for the total population and for the 
unconnected population only between just under 4 and 4.5, depending on the assumptions on household 
consumption.
26 The data thus confirms that inadequate water supply by water utilities places a heavy 
burden on the unconnected population. Burkina Faso has a low WAIO because its informal/retail 
standpipe price is actually below that of house connections.
27 South Africa and Namibia have WAIO’s 
close to 1 because they have high levels of formal connections, and low prices for alternatives (including 
standpipes). In contrast, despite having one of the highest household connection rates (77 percent), urban 
Senegal has a WAIO for the unconnected population of 4.15 but an overall WAIO of only 1.42, reflecting 
the relatively high unit prices faced by the minority of urban residents without connections, but the high 
overall coverage rate.  
There are three important caveats of this indicator: First, it does not include owned or free resources 
such as private wells or the fetching of water directly from a river. Second, it measures the higher price of 
water compared to the price for the household connection. In certain cities with a formal standpipe price 
that is highly subsidized (with a substantially higher household connection price), the informal standpipe 
price might be equal to or slightly higher than that of the household connection. As a result, the 
coefficient is close to one, whereas the ratio of the informal over the formal standpipe price could be 
much more than one. Third, this analysis does not consider service quality measures such as distance to 
the supplier, time needed to collect the water or water quality and pressure. 
This measure does provide an indication of distortions in the urban water market and help to better 
track the impact of policies on access and price for the whole water market, not just for the connected 
market. In Mozambique, the regulator (CRA) regularly carried out consumer assessments to measure 
formal and informal water prices, coverage, and quality.  
While the WAIO calculated above uses DHS data and thus provides cross-country information, it 
does not specifically include the household reseller market, for which there is almost no comparable 
cross-country data. Nonetheless, the case of Maputo, Mozambique, which throughout its urban water 
reform process has tracked prices and coverage of both the informal and the formal water market through 
detailed beneficiary assessments, allows one to calculate the full WAIO below (table 3.8). The results 
confirm the order of magnitude of the calculations performed at the urban level with DHS and AICD data. 
The median value of the total WAIO on a consumption of the water volume of 10m3/month with DHS 
and AICD data is 2.08, and rises to 2.57 for the unconnected population. The median value of the total 
WAIO on a consumption of the water volume of 10m3/month based on the Maputo data is 1.62, and rises 
to 1.82 for the unconnected population (BA Maputo 2006). 
                                                 
26 On a consumption of the water volume of 4m3/month, the median value of the total WAIO is almost 2, and rises 
to almost 4 for the unconnected population. For the water volume of 10m3/month, the median value of the total 
WAIO is 2.7 and rises to 4.5 WAIOs for the unconnected population. Another important clarification is that the 
water price used for the household connections has been calculated assuming the same level of consumption for all 
countries, both at 4m3/month and 10m3/month level. More detailed analyses are needed to understand the effect that 
real consumption levels have on the price, and therefore in the calculation of the indicator. 
27 Based on price data as reported under the AICD by utilities, and coverage data as reported by DHS. PROVISION OF WATER TO THE POOR IN AFRICA 
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Table 3.8    WAIO in Maputo 
Coverage Price
(%) (US$/m3)
Adem connection 22.8% 0.44
SSIP connection 11.5% 0.88
HH reseller 25.8% 0.81
Public standpipe 14.3% 0.58
SSIP standpipe 11.4% 0.92
Pvt B/H /neighbours 6.9% 0.99
Own B/H 5.6% 0.00
Public handpump 1.9% 0.00
Total 100%
Source: BA Maputo 2006
WAIO (total) 1.62
WAIO (unconnected) 1.82  
 
The lack of attention to standpipe pricing and management issues, together with the constraints that 
utilities face in expanding service to a rapidly growing population, means that in low coverage countries, 
the poor remain largely outside of the formal sector. This indicator provides a more accurate picture of the 
reality faced by all of the urban population in low coverage countries than formal coverage and prices 
alone, and can therefore provide a useful tool for monitoring purposes before and during reform 
processes. 
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4    Conclusions 
Utilities in African cities have not been able to keep up with the rapid pace of urban growth, in spite 
of increasing the number of water connections. As a  result, the urban populations with no direct water 
connections are expanding. This paper assesses the current level of knowledge and data on this important 
segment of water consumers, and identifies priorities for further research. 
Public water provision to the unconnected 
Water supply through public standpipes has been the most common public solution to extend 
improved water services in newly developed areas in the city and to an increasing slum population. 
Standpipes are the most important source for the urban unconnected population, according to utility data; 
household survey (DHS) data confirm that all types of standpipes (not just public) accounted for 28 
percent of urban coverage in surveyed countries, the most important source after house connections. 
However, this coverage has generally been overestimated for a variety of reasons; many public standpipes 
(almost one-third) are nonfunctional. 
There has been a shift away from provision of free public standpipes managed by utilities to the 
delegation of standpipe management to private operators, to communities, or to community leaders. Only 
27 percent of the utilities sampled still had standpipes free of charge. Delegation represents an effort to 
reduce the management burden (and cost) on the utility. The experience with different management 
models has been very mixed, both within cities and among cities, and has generally not resulted in the 
provision of a lower cost service.  
While standpipes theoretically can offer a lower cost service to a larger number of consumers, there 
have been significant implementation challenges with these schemes. In particular, delegating standpipe 
management to community leaders or groups has run into problems when such schemes assume that 
complex urban social environments have well formed “communities”. Urban areas within cities are often 
heterogeneous, with varied levels of social capital and community cohesion. Failure to take this context 
into account has led in some cases to political involvement in the selection of standpipe managers, to the 
“capture” of kiosks or standpipes by local elites or individuals with little accountability to consumers, to a 
failure to pay utilities because of the known political cost of shutting off standpipes for non-payment and 
to the provision of a low quality service at a higher price. Private contractors can increase the efficiency 
of water provision, but they also tend to increase the cost to the consumer. 
In general, many standpipe management schemes have lacked a focus on information sharing to 
broader groups of consumers (on prices, management structures, feedback mechanisms, or recourse for 
mismanagement), and transparency in the selection and management processes. Further, regulators have, 
by and large, not provided sufficient attention to monitoring, pricing or quality issues in this sub-sector. 
Utilities are often not well equipped to deal with these political economy issues. The culture of many 
utilities, particularly those without incentives aligned to broader policies of expanding access, tends to 
center around technical aspects of service delivery, and meeting financial performance targets. Further, PROVISION OF WATER TO THE POOR IN AFRICA 
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utilities have little incentive to prioritize attention to this sector, as in many large cities, standpipes 
account for a small portion  of revenues (typically less than 10 percent); in some cases, this leads to a low 
level equilibrium where a minimal amount is invested in standpipes that tend to offer low levels of service 
and bring in little revenue. Thus, cost recovery from standpipes tends to be low, and in response, some 
utilities informally ration water to standpipes to limit losses or allow them to fall into disrepair. 
The result of some of these implementation problems has been higher prices for standpipe water to 
consumers, in spite of “social” tariffs for almost three-quarters of sampled cities. In 89 percent of the 
sample cities, the informal/retail standpipe unit price exceeded that for house connections, often by a 
significant margin, and tended to align with the going rate in the informal water market. At the same time, 
the formal or wholesale standpipe price falls far below the retail/informal price that consumers actually 
pay. Analysis of maintenance and management costs suggests that this price difference represents a 
substantial transfer of profits from the utility to the standpipe manager, rather than a reflection of 
operating costs. Among the cities studied, this transfer can represent between $0.19 million to $1.3 
million per annum per city. Thus, while standpipes are already heavily subsidized by utilities, almost none 
of this subsidy reaches the ultimate consumers of the water.  
The trend towards high standpipe prices, declining service levels, and in some countries, lower 
effective standpipe coverage has implications for the poor. In countries that already have relatively high 
price structures, this could lead to a shift from improved to unimproved sources of water. A clear 
indicator of “stress” on this front can be seen in the diversity of sources used; in countries such as the 
Copperbelt region of Zambia in 2000, most households used one source of water because coverage was 
relatively high and formal water prices relatively low. In countries where prices begin to approach 
affordability limits, households ration the use of standpipe water for drinking/cooking and seek other 
sources for other uses, further adding to the time burden on the household. 
Standpipe schemes that have succeeded have generally had more monitoring by a supporting 
institution – whether the utility, or outside groups (such as larger more formalized water associations with 
accountability procedures, or larger more professional NGOs). Monitoring by a supporting institution can 
add to the administrative cost. Successful schemes have also involved taking the social context and level 
of social cohesion into account in determining management structures and arrangements. This implies 
increasing the “soft” skills of utility staff to be able to assess local market and social conditions. Finally, 
more successful schemes have included well-thought-through checks and balances to minimize political 
interference in management and rent-seeking behavior by standpipe managers. Service of good quality at 
a fair and transparent price is directly associated with dedicated participation of the utility in the model in 
monitoring the adequate status of the standpipes, regularly collecting the water revenues, and providing 
technical assistance to the standpipe operators. It is essential to define a good set of incentives so that the 
utility maintains an interest in participating in the standpipe business. 
One promising standpipe model is that of the pre-paid standpipe, currently being implemented in 
Lesotho, South Africa and Namibia. This promises to reduce management costs for the utility (although 
the up-front cost of the equipment is not low), and do a better job of passing lower tariffs onto the end-
consumer. It must be noted, however, that even with this service, it is important to ensure good 
publication of prices and management arrangements because these could be “captured” as well by local 
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Overall, beyond the review of case studies, there is little empirical cross-country data to refine the 
analysis of the characteristics of well functioning standpipes. However, most of the case studies reviewed 
point to the importance of maintenance, monitoring and the site-specific social and competitive water 
context (the existence of alternatives to the standpipe). This suggests that one solution for better 
management should include more flexibility at the design and siting stage. 
The informal urban water market 
A thriving “informal” water market has stepped into the coverage gap. The three most common 
providers in this market consist of people who resell from their network house connection, independent 
small piped systems or kiosks not attached to the network supply, and mobile vendors or water tankers.  
By far the most significant informal water source consists of those who resell from their household 
connection, particularly in medium-low coverage countries (70 percent of surveyed utilities noted that this 
was common). In the few places where resale has been measured, the sales volume of this market can be 
significant (for example, US$1.5 million in Maputo in 1996) and can actually exceed the total residential 
sales volume received by the utility. This source can account for as much as one third of overall coverage 
in a city, and more than this among the unconnected urban population, particularly in cities with low to 
medium levels of connection, with high up-front costs to connect to the network, or where utilities are 
simply unable to respond to requests for connections.  
Households, particularly those in high crime “inner” peri-urban areas, often prefer to buy water from 
their neighbor instead of relying on a standpipe because of distance and time factors. However, many also 
use this source because it is the only one available (particularly as standpipes break down). In addition, 
low income households may not have a sufficiently steady income to allow for their own household 
connection. However, a 2006 study in Mozambique showed that 40 percent of those purchasing from 
neighbors had established monthly payment systems that were more cost effective per unit.
28 This points 
to the importance of understanding the composition of the unconnected consumers in determining the 
appropriate service mix. 
Despite the common belief that water reselling by households with private connections is illegal in 
African cities, in reality water resellers are neither prohibited nor legalized in many cities; utilities and 
governments simply do not control and rarely contest this practice. In the cities with available data, 
standpipes acted as price-markers for the household water reseller price and vice versa.  
Mobile water vendors and tankers, although more visible, provide water to a small portion of the 
overall water market in all but a few countries. Those countries that rely on mobile water vendors have 
some specific physical or supply constraints (as in Khartoum, Accra, and Luanda). 
SSIPs, typically kiosks or small piped systems, are among the fastest growing informal water source 
as they generally offer a good level of service and hours of supply because they are not dependent on 
network sources. However, SSIPs tend to be important in niche areas of cities that are generally just 
beyond the network and can represent between 9 percent and 12 percent of a city’s water coverage.  
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An issue likely to emerge in the next ten years will be the increasing competition between utilities and 
private operators, particularly SSIPs, as utilities expand their network and begin to operate in the same 
areas as these providers. This will likely raise issues about whether utilities should explore contracts with 
these providers, or seek to regulate their prices. 
All water service providers are interconnected in terms of the final price offered to the consumer. The 
more disrupted the piped water system is, the higher the price in the informal sector compared to the 
formal sector. Inadequate water supply by utilities places a heavy burden on the unconnected population 
as a whole.  
Considerations for policy makers 
Meeting the MDGs: the service mix  
Recent literature on Africa has highlighted the challenges ahead in terms of meeting the Millennium 
Development Goals for water access, given gaps in infrastructure financing and institutional constraints in 
terms of utility efficiency and capacity. In light of limited resources, policymakers may look towards 
greater focus on standpipes at the expense of household connections to increase coverage more quickly at 
lower cost. However, there is a significant discord between the policy goals and the incentives faced by 
utilities; to date, most utilities have only extended standpipes to the degree that they also extend 
household connections that allow them to cover the cost of service extension. 
Clearly, if one were to shift towards a greater proportion of standpipes in the service mix, this would 
require a substantial shift in strategy and incentives for utilities, both in terms of better management and 
monitoring, but also in terms of the pricing structure and financial gain for the utility. Under the current 
pricing and management schemes, moving this approach to scale is not likely to be financially 
sustainable. As noted above, this will also likely require some investment by utilities in “soft” aspects of 
service extension; indeed, one option would be to re-direct subsidies that currently benefit connected 
customers and standpipe managers to support this capacity in human resources in the utilities. New 
standpipe models, such as the pre-paid standpipe, should be closely monitored as they may provide a 
viable solution to some of these challenges. 
If utilities continue to ignore this sub-sector, there will be consequences for the poor. In some cities 
with higher connection rates (Johannesburg, parts of Dakar), standpipe customers are often primarily the 
poor or those who have been disconnected. Eliminating standpipes, or allowing them to deteriorate, 
would have a negative impact on this population. In other countries, standpipes serve a more 
heterogeneous group of consumers, including those who may be eligible for house connections, and those 
who are able to purchase from neighbors. Policymakers and utilities need to better understand the nature 
of their standpipe customer before eliminating or reducing their attention to this source. 
An obvious option for expanding coverage would be to further explore the existing distribution 
mechanisms of resale of house connection water. To start, if better data were available on this sector, one 
could conceivably include in coverage estimates those purchasing water from households with 
connections; if this were done, indications suggest that formal coverage rates in Africa would increase 
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There are several advantages to household resale of water. It can reduce the burden of bill collection 
on the utility, and for consumers who have trouble managing a monthly payment (which is the majority of 
those in the informal sector), household re-sale offers a “middle ground” between standpipe and house 
connection service. However, this source is not necessarily equitable in terms of access (it can be denied 
at will and pricing is often different depending on whether one is known or not) nor in terms of prices 
compared to the person paying for a house connection. Nonetheless, for countries where utilities face 
financial constraints in terms of service extension or where the next incremental customer is unlikely to 
be able to sustain the monthly cost of a house connection, there is potential to better explore partnerships 
with private individuals over resale of water. This would imply focusing public efforts on providing good 
models for equitable pricing among neighbors, and providing support for safe storage of water. 
Better monitoring indicators  
For countries with a significant informal sector, surveys and policymakers should consider 
monitoring not only the formal sector water prices and access, but also informal sector prices and market 
share (for example, using the WAIO measure introduced here). This is particularly true during periods of 
water sector reform, and would provide a better indication of the health of the overall water market. 
Mozambique provides a good example of how this was done over time.  
In addition, in assessing the impact of higher formal tariffs, it would be useful for standardized 
surveys to assess and track the number of water sources per household over time, and to explore whether 
this is driven by supply constraints or by price. The use of multiple sources can be one sign of stress in 
terms of pricing. 
Regulators need to play a greater role in monitoring the standpipe sector, including the number of 
operational standpipes and quality of service (in terms of price, water pressure, hours of service 
operation).  
More transparency in pricing, increased social accountability and feedback mechanisms 
One way to increase the transparency of pricing mechanisms could be through the intensive 
publication of formal prices and of management arrangements and responsibilities to broader groups of 
consumers. This would increase the accountability of standpipe operators and could potentially place 
downwards pressure on prices. To improve the efficiency of this sector, and potentially reduce the amount 
of resources that are currently “captured” by middlemen, steps could include the following: provide 
regular feedback mechanisms for consumers; conduct beneficiary assessments to assess whether 
consumers are even aware of the responsibilities of the operator or rights of the consumer; monitor retail 
standpipe prices.It is likely that utilities will need to follow the example of standpipe arrangements that 
have been more successful, and invest in adequate incentive structures and monitoring. However, doing 
so may reduce the profit levels of standpipe managers, and allow the utility to raise the wholesale price 
for standpipe water.  
Priorities for future research 
Given the importance of the unconnected market, there are several priorities for future research. 
These include: expanding the empirical cross-country research on management models (and management 
costs) for public standpipes; assessing the size and price of the resale market and improving existing PROVISION OF WATER TO THE POOR IN AFRICA 
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cross-country household surveys to reflect the major providers in this market; developing more accurate 
assessments of the percentage of public standpipes that are functional and/or disconnected and reasons for 
non-functioning; exploring factors behind the variations in retail pricing of public standpipes; and 
tracking and better understanding how changes in formal tariffs for house connection customers feed into 
informal tariffs in the resale market. 
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Appendix 1   Water provision diagram 
 
 
Source: Collignon and Vézina 2000. 
Note: 10 capital cities. Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda. 
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Appendix 2   Total, urban, and slum population growth, sorted by urban 
population growth 
 Growth  (annual  average)  Urban 
 Total  Urban  Slum  Pop 
 (1990-2005)  (1995-2000)*  (1990-2001)  (2005) 
Country (%)  (%)  (%)  (%) 
Mozambique 2.60  6.30  6.94  38 
Tanzania 2.50  6.06  6.16  38 
Niger 3.30  5.92  5.89  23 
Kenya 2.50  5.77  5.88  42 
Mauritania 2.80  5.32  5.60  64 
Sudan 2.20  5.09  5.19  41 
Cameroon 2.20  5.05  4.20  53 
Malawi 2.10  5.04  3.92  17 
Nigeria 2.50  5.01  4.98  48 
Angola 2.80  5.00  5.28  37 
Burkina Faso  2.90  4.95  3.97  19 
Benin 3.30  4.51  5.34  46 
Chad 3.20  4.45  4.26  26 
Namibia 2.50  4.35  2.88  34 
Ghana 2.40  4.03  1.83  46 
Ethiopia 2.20  4.02  4.81  16 
Senegal 2.50  4.00  4.05  51 
Cape Verde  2.42  3.96  5.42  58 
Uganda 3.20  3.60  5.32  12 
Madagascar 2.90  3.33  5.33  27 
Cote d'Ivoire  2.40  3.31  N/V  N/V 
Rwanda 1.60  3.20  3.55  22 
DRC 2.80  2.87  3.61  33 
South Africa  1.90  2.51  0.91  58 
Lesotho 0.80  1.41  6.32  18 
Zambia  2.20 0.94 2.88  37 
Average 2.49  4.23  4.58  36.11 
pop weighted av  2.50  4.39  4.43  36.51 
* Except for Rwanda (1990-1995)       
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Appendix 3   Conflict Index 
Number of years since 
the last violent conflict 




1 2 3 4 1+2 1+2+3 1+2+4 1+2+3+4
(yr) (yr) (# casualties)
(% casualties / 
population)
(#)










Angola 5 27 500,000 3.14% 61,700 0.4% 2 2 2 0 4 6 4 6
Sudan 0 22 2,300,000 6.35% 5,355,000 18.6% 2 2 2 2 4 6 6 8
Uganda 0 25 12,000 0.04% 1,297,000 8.2% 2 2 0 2 4 4 6 6
Mozambique 15 15 900,000 4.55% 0.0% 1 2 2 0 3 5 3 5
Namibia 18 24 N/V N / V 0 . 0 % 1 20 03 3 3 3
Chad 0 5 614 0.01% 172,600 0.9% 2 1 0 0 3 3 3 3
Cote d'Ivoire 2 5 1,800 0.01% 709,000 1.9% 2 1 0 1 3 3 4 4
DRC 0 13 4,000,000 6.96% 1,000,000 10.3% 2 2 2 2 4 6 6 8
Ethiopia 7 30 310,000 0.08% 190,000 1.6% 2 2 0 1 4 4 5 5
L e s o t h o 8 100 . 0 0 % 0 . 0 %20 0 0 2222
Rwanda 13 1 900,000 10.00% 650,000 1.8% 1 0 2 1 1 3 2 4
Benin >30 0 0 0.00% 0.0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B u r k i n a  F a s o > 3 0 000 . 0 0 % 0 . 0 %00 0 0 0000
Niger >30 0 0 0.00% 0.0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Senegal >30 0 0 0.00% 64,000 0.5% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S o u t h  A f r i c a > 3 0 000 . 0 0 % 0 . 0 %00 0 0 0000
M a l a w i > 3 0 000 . 0 0 % 0 . 0 %00 0 0 0000
Z a m b i a > 3 0 000 . 0 0 % 0 . 0 %00 0 0 0000
Cameroon >30 0 0 0.00% 0.0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cape Verde >30 0 0 0.00% 0.0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Madagascar >30 0 0 0.00% 0.0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
T a n z a n i a > 3 0 000 . 0 0 % 0 . 0 %00 0 0 0000
M a u r i t a n i a> 3 0 000 . 0 0 % 0 . 0 %00 0 0 0000
Nigeria >30 0 0 0.00% 200,000 1.0% 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
Ghana >30 0 0 0.00% 190,000 2.1% 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
Kenya >30 0 0 0.00% 431,000 3.7% 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 2
Source: UN DPKO; IDMC Global Statistics
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Appendix 4   Percentage of unconnected population at the city level with 
population density 
   City  Unconnected  Density  Conflict 
Conflict index  Country  (largest)  (%)  (ppl/km2)  Index 
High  
Sudan  Great Khartoum  73  6,850  8 
DRC  Kinshasa 64  10,650  8 
Uganda  Kampala 70  118 6 
Medium  
Angola  Luanda (2)  80  1,093 6 
Ethiopia Addis  Ababa  61  5,457  5 
Mozambique Maputo  74  4,400  5 
Cote d'Ivoire  Abidjan (2)  35  1,728  4 
Rwanda  Kigali (1)  65  1,067  4 
Chad N'Djamena  (2) 78  819 3 
Namibia Windhoek  27  362  3 
Low  
Lesotho  Maseru (1)  67  112 2 
Kenya Nairobi  49  4,230  2 
Nigeria Kaduna  52  132 1 
Ghana Accra  (1)  45  3,300  1 
Malawi Blantyre  53  191 0 
Cameroon Douala  (2)  76  109 0 
Cape Verde  Praia  66  477 0 
Madagascar Antananarivo  (1)  58  79 0 
Senegal Dakar  (1)  23  26,208  0 
Zambia Lusaka  73  18,000  0 
Benin Cotonou  (1)  69  14,905  0 
Tanzania  Dar es Salaam  71  14,399  0 
South Africa  Johannesburg  12  2,500  0 
Burkina Faso  Ouagadougou (1)  66  1,512  0 
Niger Niamey  (2)  69  1,269  0 
Mauritania Nouakchott  (2)  72  558  0 
  Average  60  4,636   
  Median  66  1,390   
  Minimum 12  79   
  Maximum 80  26,208   
Source: AICD WSS database, UN data, DHS Urban, other sources. 
Note: Shading = density of province in which city is located. 
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Appendix 5   Water supply chain in two African cities 
Figure 1: Accra 
 
 
Figure 2: Khartoum 
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South Africa  ht  12  10  0.2  0.1  82.7  2.5 
Namibia 79  21 19 0.0 0.0  90.2  0.3 
Senegal 77  23 12 0.0 0.1  50.4  0.4 
Cote d'Ivoire  65  35  15  0.0  0.0  43.4  0.0 






Lesotho 50 50 38 0.2 0.0  77.4  0.3 
Kenya 50  50  20  0.0  0.6  40.6  1.2 
Ethiopia 48 52 41 0.7 0.0  79.3  1.3 
Zambia 46 54 36 0.1  0.0  67.6  0.2 
DRC 40  60  25  N/V  N/V  40.9  N/V 
Sudan 37  63  12  N/V  N/V  18.7  N/V 
Ghana 34  66  38  2.3  1.8  57.7  6.2 
Burkina 
Faso 33  67  53  0.0  0.0  79.4  0.0 
Malawi 32  68  43  0.0  0.0  63.3  0.0 





Mauritania 28  72  24  6.8  25.3  32.8  44.3 
Cameroon 24  76  43  0.0  0.0  57.1  0.0 
Tanzania 22  78  45  2.8  3.7 58.0 8.4 
Chad 22  78  23  0.0  16.3  29.4  20.8 
Mozambique 20  80  43  0.0  0.0  53.4  0.0 
Madagascar 17  83  47  0.0  0.0  56.2  0.0 
Rwanda 16  84 41 0.1 0.1  48.3  0.1 
Nigeria 15  85  17  6.0  5.5  20.0  13.6 




High  83 17 10 0.2  0.1  70.7  1.9 
weighted 
average Low-Medium 41  59  28  0.7  2.0  48.2  4.0 
   Very Low  18  82  27  4.2  6.0  33.9  12.7 
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Appendix 7   Standpipe and kiosk management models 
Majority group  Country  City 
Independent from utility water 
Dependent on utility water 
Utility direct management 
Delegated managem
Third party  Sup
Private  Community  Free  of  charge Utility  Staff Pre-payment Private Community Privat
Utility 
South Africa  Johannesburg                
Namibia  Windhoek                
Lesotho  Maseru                   
Zambia  Lusaka                 
Madagascar  Antananarivo                 
Nigeria  Kaduna                  
Cape Verde  Praia                
Sudan  Great Khartoum                 
Private  
Benin  Cotonou              
Burkina 
Faso Ouagadougou                 
Niger  Niamey               
Rwanda  Kigali               
Kenya  Nairobi                  
Senegal  Dakar               
Community 
Mozambique  Maputo                   
Ethiopia  Addis Ababa                  
Malawi  Blantyre                   
Tanzania  Dar es Salaam                     
Source: AICD WSS database 2007 and other. 
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Appendix 8   Methodology for estimating the annual gross profit and the 
annual cross-subsidy between household consumers and standpipes 
captured by standpipe operators in a city 
The following figure shows the price charged by the utility to the standpipe operators (formal or 
official standpipe price) and to a household with a private connection; and the price charged by the 
standpipe operator to the consumers (informal standpipe tariff). We define unitary standpipe operator 
gross profit and unitary cross-subsidy between consumers with a household connection and standpipe 
operators in the following way: 
Unitary standpipe operator gross profit (PG) ($/m
3) = Informal standpipe price ($/m
3) – Formal 
standpipe price ($/m
3) 
Unitary cross-subsidy HH connection-Standpipe operator (SHH-Stdp) ($/m
3) = HH consumer price 
($/m
3) – Formal standpipe price ($/m
3) 
 
Since the tariff of a household with private connection in volumetric terms depends on the level of 
consumption, we have to define a common level of consumption to compare tariff structures across 
countries. For that, we take as a reference the average consumption level of 60 l/c/d for people with a 
household private connection as it appears in Banerjee and others 2007, which in its turn is based on the 
recent survey by Water Utility Partnership in 2002. When analyzing the cross-subsidies between small 
and large consumers in Banerjee and others 2007, one interesting finding is that the fixed fee and 
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connection. Therefore, despite the fact that the inverted block tariff is commonplace in African countries, 
the two-part tariff structure can fail to lead to a price favouring small consumers (Banerjee and others 
2007). In fact, except for a few countries, the consumers with a household connection that pay the lowest 
price are not the small consumers (25l/c/d) but the average ones (60l/c/d). In that sense, taking 60l/c/d as a 
reference can help us to define the lower boundary (and a better estimate) of the cross-subsidy between 
consumers with a household connection and standpipe operators. 
In order to estimate the annual gross profit of the standpipe operators and the annual cross-subsidy 
between the consumer with a household connection and the standpipe operator, we use the following 
formulation: 
Annual gross profit of standpipe operators ($/yr) = PG x U x 365 (d/yr) x 1000 (l/ m
3) x P x C 
Where: 
PG ($/m
3): Unitary standpipe operator gross profit 
U (l/c/d): Standpipe unit consumption. Based on the AICD data, it is fixed at 25l/c/d 
P (#): City population  
C ( percent): Coverage of the water service by standpipes 
Annual cross-subsidy between the consumer with a household connection and the standpipe operator 
($/yr) = SHH-Stdp x U x 365 (d/yr) x 1000 (l/ m
3) x P x C 
Where: 
SHH-Stdp ($/m
3): Unitary cross-subsidy between household consumer-Standpipe operator 
U (l/c/d): Standpipe unit consumption. Based on the AICD data, it is fixed at 25l/c/d 
P (#): City population  






This study is a product of the Africa Infrastructure Country 
Diagnostic (AICD), a project designed to expand the 
world’s knowledge of physical infrastructure in Africa. 
AICD will provide a baseline against which future 
improvements in infrastructure services can be measured, 
making it possible to monitor the results achieved from 
donor support. It should also provide a better empirical 
foundation for prioritizing investments and designing 
policy reforms in Africa’s infrastructure sectors.  
AICD is based on an unprecedented effort to collect 
detailed economic and technical data on African 
infrastructure. The project has produced a series of reports 
(such as this one) on public expenditure, spending needs, 
and sector performance in each of the main infrastructure 
sectors—energy, information and communication 
technologies, irrigation, transport, and water and sanitation. 
Africa’s Infrastructure—A Time for Transformation, 
published by the World Bank in November 2009, 
synthesizes the most significant findings of those reports.  
AICD was commissioned by the Infrastructure Consortium 
for Africa after the 2005 G-8 summit at Gleneagles, which 
recognized the importance of scaling up donor finance for 
infrastructure in support of Africa’s development.  
The first phase of AICD focused on 24 countries that 
together account for 85 percent of the gross domestic 
product, population, and infrastructure aid flows of Sub-
Saharan Africa. The countries are: Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Cape Verde, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, 
Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Under a second phase of 
the project, coverage is expanding to include as many other 
African countries as possible.  
Consistent with the genesis of the project, the main focus is 
on the 48 countries south of the Sahara that face the most 
severe infrastructure challenges. Some components of the 
study also cover North African countries so as to provide a 










The World Bank is implementing AICD with the guidance 
of a steering committee that represents the African Union, 
the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), 
Africa’s regional economic communities, the African 
Development Bank, the Development Bank of Southern 
Africa, and major infrastructure donors.  
Financing for AICD is provided by a multidonor trust fund 
to which the main contributors are the U.K.’s Department 
for International Development, the Public Private 
Infrastructure Advisory Facility, Agence Française de 
Développement, the European Commission, and Germany’s 
KfW Entwicklungsbank. The Sub-Saharan Africa Transport 
Policy Program and the Water and Sanitation Program 
provided technical support on data collection and analysis 
pertaining to their respective sectors. A group of 
distinguished peer reviewers from policy-making and 
academic circles in Africa and beyond reviewed all of the 
major outputs of the study to ensure the technical quality of 
the work. 
The data underlying AICD’s reports, as well as the reports 
themselves, are available to the public through an 
interactive Web site, www.infrastructureafrica.org, that 
allows users to download customized data reports and 
perform various simulations. Inquiries concerning the 
availability of data sets should be directed to the editors at 




   
 
 